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ABSTRACT
This thesis evaluates the need for public sector
participation in the development of South Harbor, a large,
mixed-use project proposed for the city of Lynn,
Massachusetts.
First, the need for active public sector involvement is
established, by examining the site's many constraints to
development. Second, the public sector's ability to assume
this active role in the development process is evaluated by
studying Lynn's involvement in another local, public-private
development project, known as Seaport Landing. Third, the
financial feasibility of the program proposed for the site
is analyzed and it is determined that the public sector will
have to provide the project with substantial financial
assistance, if it is ever to be economically feasible.
Finally, the authors identify those issues that the city of
Lynn must resolve before South Harbor can be developed and
recommend an order that the city should follow in attempting
to resolve them.
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Introduction
In its heyday Lynn, Massachusetts was a bustling,
thriving blue-collar community with many industrial
employers. Between 1965 and 1978, however, one third of the
city's industrial employers left Lynn, the unemployment rate
climbed and the population decreased by over twenty percent,
from 100,000 to 78,000. In 1981 a tragic fire burned part
of the central business district to the ground. Allegations
of corruption and mismanagement have been made often against
city officials and the city has been the target of numerous
media investigations which perpetuate the public's
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perception of Lynn as a worn, blighted and corrupt city.
Well aware of the city's image problems, Lynn officials, in
the recent past, have sought to alter the public's
perception of the city. The city has funded a public
relations campaign that emphasizes Lynn's positive features:
its 8.3 mile shoreline, its highly skilled labor force and
its proximity to Boston. In addition, city officials have
encouraged the development of high visibility projects
downtown. Now, in their most ambitious effort to date, Lynn
officials propose to engineer the development of a large,
mixed-use project on 56 acres of waterfront property, known
as South Harbor.
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the feasibility
of this proposed development and to recommend how any city
involvement with the project should be structured. In
particular, this paper undertakes to answer four questions.
First, what are the development risks associated with the
site itself and what do these risks imply about the need for
public sector involvement? Second, what are the strengths
and weaknesses of the process by which development-related
decisions get made in Lynn? Third, is the program that has
been proposed for the site feasible, from both a market and
financial perspective? Finally, what issues must the city
resolve for South Harbor to become a reality and in what
order should the city resolve them? The authors conclude
from their research, that Lynn city officials possess the
will and the expertise necessary to resolve the major land
assembly issues, financial feasibility issues, and public-
private partnership issues that must be resolved, if they
hope to bring about the development of South Harbor.
It should be noted at the outset that this thesis does
not attempt to perform a highest and best use analysis for
the site nor does it attempt to perform a market analysis to
confirm that a demand truly exists for the types and
quantities of uses identified in studies commissioned by the
city of Lynn. Instead, this paper takes the preliminary
program as given and bases its financial feasibility
analysis thereon. Through the study of the city's
involvement in another mixed-use, waterfront project,
through interviews with Lynn officials and through computer-
assisted financial analysis, this thesis identifies the
problems that must be solved in order for South Harbor to be
developed successfully and suggests approaches for solving
them.
The South Harbor site itself is located at the southern
entrance to the city at the foot of the General Edwards
Bridge. As Map Exhibit 2 illustrates, the 56-acre site is
bounded on the east by Lynn Harbor, on the south by the
Saugus River, on the north by various industrial uses, and
on the west by Route 1A, known locally as The Lynnway.
The American City Corporation, a consulting firm hired
by the city to assess South Harbor's development potential,
has recommended a preliminary program for the site which
calls for the development of a high-density, large-scale,
mixed-use project. The program includes a 350-room hotel,
restaurants, 500,000 square feet of multi-tenant office
space, 12,000 square feet of retail space, 350 to 600
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residential condominiums and a marina. Specific details of
this program will be discussed in the financial feasibility
section of the third chapter.
In the first chapter, the history of the site will be
described in detail and the major constraints to its
development will be evaluated in terms of what they imply
about the need for the public sector to take an active role
in the development process.
Chapter two will evaluate the city of Lynn as a player
in the development of South Harbor. This evaluation will be
undertaken in three steps. First, Lynn's role as regulator
of the development process is explored by examining the
city's formal political structure. Next, Lynn's ability to
step beyond its regulatory role and to take an active,
entrepreneurial position in the development process is
examined by looking at the city's informal decision-making
network. Finally, conclusions are drawn about the strengths
and weaknesses of the city's methods for making development-
related decisions, and about what these strengths and
weaknesses imply about the city's ability to control the
South Harbor development process.
Chapter three is divided into two sections and
addresses project feasibility. The first section presents
a comprehensive financial feasibility analysis of the
preliminary program, recommended for the site by the
American City Corporation. A computer model was constructed
to test the economic viability of this program through pro
forma analysis. This model evaluates the impact on project
feasibility of changes in critical parameters such as public
or private debt and equity financing, project phasing and
operating revenues. The project is shown to be infeasible
unless operating revenues can be increased substantially and
unless private and public sector financial support can be
obtained. The second section evaluates the American City
Corporation's market study and the preliminary program that
this study has recommended for the site.
The final chapter draws on those which precede it to
identify the issues that the city must resolve if the South
Harbor project is to become a reality. Recommendations are
made for how the city should proceed with plans to develop
the site.
Chapter One: The Need for Active
Public Sector Involvement
The public sector is a potential player in every
development project. Its role can vary from purely
regulatory, such as when it issues or refuses to issue a
building permit for the construction of a home, to actively
entrepreneurial, such as when it assumes the role of a joint
venture partner with a private developer. The public sector
is often willing to take an active, entrepreneurial position
in the development of a project, when that project shows
promise of fulfilling important public objectives, such as
increasing municipal revenues, providing public open space,
and enhancing the image of the city. Many times, projects
that have the potential of fulfilling public objectives
require active public sector support to make them feasible.
This active support often includes commitments to secure
funding for the project, to assemble land for the project
and to solicit developers for the project.
This chapter analyzes whether Lynn's role in the
development of South Harbor can be passive and regulatory in
nature, or whether the city will have to assume an active
and entrepreneurial role to see the site developed. After
outlining the reasons why Lynn wants to see South Harbor
developed as a large mixed-use project, the history of the
site is detailed and its major physical and legal
liabilities are identified. Next, the magnitude of these
site constraints is assessed, which permits conclusions to
be drawn about the need for active public support of the
project.
Lynn Wants South Harbor
The idea to develop South Harbor came from Lynn city
officials. All officials interviewd want to see the site
developed because they believe that a successful mixed-use
project, on the site, would provide substantial benefits to
the city. One benefit of such a development is that it
would make the city more alive and would lead to greater
diversity and vitality in its downtown. In addition, such a
development would make significant contributions to
municipal revenues, which is an important benefit
considering that the site has generated no virtually no
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income for the city in the past seven years. Also, by
virtue of its scale and character, a successful mixed-use
development at South Harbor could change the rather seedy
quality of the area surrounding the site by increasing the
land value of this area to a level where it would be more
productive to use the land for something else. Such a
development would create jobs, not only during construction,
but also after the complex was operational. Finally, and
most important, according to Lynn city officials, is their
belief that the successful development of the site will
improve Lynn's image, and give the city something of which
it can be proud.
History of the South Harbor Site
The 56-acre South Harbor site is composed of several
parcels of land, each owned by one of three entities: Hy
Brettman, a citizen of Lynn who owns approximately 7 acres,
Harbor House, a Lynn corporation which owns approximately 4
acres and America East, a Lynn corporation which owns
approximately 36 acres. (See Map Exhibit One.) The
irregularly shaped site is bounded on the east by Lynn
Harbor, on the south by the Saugus River, on the north by
various industrial uses and on the west by Route lA, known
locally as the Lynnway.
The site and much of the area surrounding it, were
created as a result of federal legislation enacted in the
late 1920s to help cities create industrial property.
Through this legislation the city of Lynn received financial
assistance to dredge the Lynn Harbor and to use the sludge
it removed from the harbor to create the land area of which
South Harbor is a part. The land sat empty for many years
until the city began to use it as a landfill. In addition,
it erected a now-decaying bulkhead along the entire length
4
of the property.
In 1960, entities which have since become the
Massachusetts Electric Company (MECO) and the New England
12
Power Company (NEP) purchased 85 acres of this land from the
city with the expressed intention of building a power-
generating station. The power companies paid $100,000 for
the property. According to Director of City Planning, Kevin
Geaney, there was rumored to be a clause in the agreement of
sale that provided for the land to revert to the city if the
power companies did not build the power-generating station.
However, no one has ever been able to produce written
documentation of this reverter clause. The agreement did
contain a clause, however, that permitted the city to
continue to use the site as a landfill, but limited this
right by giving the power companies the authority to require
the city to remove the contents of the landfill at their
5
request. The city stopped using the landfill in 1974.
In 1970, Lynnfield attorney, Richard Riley, through his
company, America East, presented a proposal for development
of a 70-acre portion of the power companies' land to then
mayor, Warren Cassidy. The mayor and city council rejected
6
this proposal.
In 1971, the power companies petitioned the Department
of Public Utilities (DPU) for permission to run some major
power lines across their property. The DPU and the mayor
granted their permission and the power companies strung the
7
lines which now cover the site.
In 1977, Riley once again approached the city council
with a development concept for 70 acres of power company
land. He told the city that he would develop the site into
a $53 million marine-related industrial park. Riley's
concept, with the strong support of Geaney and new mayor,
Antonio Marino, was approved by the city council. In
addition, the mayor and council authorized the Lynn Economic
Development and Industrial Corporation (LEDIC) to take the
property by eminent domain should the power companies prove
8
unreceptive to negotiations.
The LEDIC used its powers of eminent domain to take 70
acres of the power companies' property in 1978. According
to Geaney, the city did try to negotiate with the companies
to buy the property but was stymied by their corporate
bureaucracies. Evidently no one wanted to sign off on the
agreement authorizing the sale for fear that it would later
be determined by someone "higher up" that the sales price
9
was too low.
Immediately after LEDIC took the property, it entered
into a land disposition and development agreement with Riley
and his company, America East. The terms of the agreement,
which deeded the property to Riley, provided for the city
to retain an absolute right-of-first-purchase option over
all of the lands transferred to Riley. In addition, it
obligated America East to reimburse the LEDIC for any amount
the court ultimately awarded to the power companies as just
10
compensation. Riley was not successful in turning the
site into a marine industrial park. By 1981, only the
Gloucester Corporation, a fish processing company, had
11
opened a plant on the site and one local official claims
that the credit for bringing Gloucester in goes to the
LEDIC.
Riley's company, never financially strong to begin
with, encountered great financial difficulties and Riley
sold ten acres of his parcel to the West Lynn Creamery for
use as a parking lot and four acres to local car dealer, Bob
12
Brest. According to Geaney, the LEDIC did not exercise
its right to purchase the 10 acres sold to the Creamery
because West Lynn executives made it clear to the city that
if they were unable to purchase this parcel for use as a
parking lot they would not be able to enlarge their plant
and would be forced to move their operation out of Lynn.
The LEDIC permitted Brest to purchase his parcel as a
gesture of good will; the city hoped to develop the north
end of the harbor sometime in the future, which would
require them to relocate one of Brest's car dealerships. In
addition, city officials consider Brest a good corporate
13
citizen. Says Geaney, "he is hard to say no to."
In 1984, the city used a $1 million state-funded Public
Works Economic Development Grant to put in a road on the
America East parcel which made the parcel accessible to the
Lynnway (Route lA). City officials felt that this road
would enhance their ability to bring people on to the site
and would spark interest in developing it. In addition,
they wanted to have the road in place so that they could
begin subdividing the land and relocating the power lines,
without delay, should the power companies agree to alter the
14
location of their easements.
Also in 1984, the city, through its Department of
Community Development (DCD), hired American City Corporation
(ACC), a consulting subsidiary of the Rouse Company, to
prepare an assessment of South Harbor's development
potential. City officials specified that ACC should only
study the site's potential for supporting a mixed-use
project and should not investigate other possible uses for
the site. The officials made this specification because, as
will be discussed in the next chapter, they had decided that
the city needed a mixed-use development on the South Harbor
site. ACC's report culminated with the identification of a
preliminary program for the site which included hotel,
commerical, retail and residential uses. This program will
be discussed in detail in Chapter Three.
In May 1985, Riley and his financially strapped
company entered into a purchase and sale agreement with
15
Irwin Nebelkopf covering all of America East's holdings.
In addition, Nebelkopf and the group he formed to buy out
Riley's interest, America East Associates, prepared a
development proposal for the South Harbor site. Basically
this proposal does nothing more than prepare extremely
simple financial projections for a modified version of the
preliminary program identified in the American City
16
Corporation study. The Riley/Nebelkopf agreement obligated
Nebelkopf to close on the property by August 15, 1985 and to
assume America East's obligation to reimburse the LEDIC for
any just compensation payment the LEDIC would be required to
make to the power companies.
The obligation to close, however, was subject to
several conditions. One of these conditions was that the
Lynn Office of Economic Development (LOED) consent to the
17
sale. On May 30, 1985, the LOED sent a letter to
Nebelkopf outlining "a number of issues which must be
addressed for approval of the [L]EDIC." Among other things,
the LEDIC required that Nebelkopf submit a complete
breakdown of his partnership with current personal financial
18
statements from each partner. The LEDIC wanted to be sure
that Nebelkopf and his associates would be able to make good
19
on Riley's obligation to the LEDIC.
On June 10, 1985 the Superior Court of Essex County
awarded the power companies $1,600,000, which was broken
down as follows:20
o $889,500 land damage award to NEP,
o $518,876 interest to NEP,
o $94,000 land damage award to Massachusetts Electric,
o $54,833.30 interest to Massachusetts Electric.
This figure was far in excess of the $700,000 Nebelkopf and
21
the city anticipated. The size of the land damage award,
coupled with America East's near insolvency, all but
guarantee that America East will be unable to meet its
obligation to reimburse the LEDIC for the payment the LEDIC
must now make to the power companies.
Shortly after the court made the award, Nebelkopf
contacted the LEDIC and asked for more time before the LEDIC
acted on his development proposal; he wanted to meet with
Riley and discuss the implications of the size of the damage
award for their plans. The LEDIC refused to grant the
delay, claiming that it had been given insufficient
documentation on Nebelkopf's new development group. On June
18, 1985 the LEDIC voted to turn down Nebelkopf's proposal
to take over Riley's interest and to be designated as
developer of South Harbor because they were not convinced
that Nebelkopf and America East Associates was capable of
carrying out the project properly. In addition, the board,
in an executive session, met with legal counsel to discuss
the possibility of appealing the Superior Court decision,
although city officials are hoping to find a way for the
LEDIC to meet its obligation to the power companies without
22
getting into prolonged litigation.
Assets and Constraints of the South Harbor Site
South Harbor's major assets and constraints have been
foreshadowed in the descriptive history above. The
following paragraphs discuss these assets and constraints in
detail.
Constraints
The most significant development constraints on the
South Harbor site are the location of the power lines, the
composition of the soil, the disrepair of the seawall, the
existence of the sanitary landfill, the lack of regional
access, the image of Lynn and the need to resolve the
eminent domain case in order to make site assembly possible.
Power lines
Although the power companies rarely give estimates for
the cost of power line relocation, the city of Lynn
requested and received an estimate in 1978. At that time
the power companies estimated that it would cost $3.2
million to bury the powerlines that crisscrossed the South
23
Harbor site. If the $3.2 million figure is inflated at a
6% annual rate, the cost of burying the power lines in 1985
would be over $4 million and in 1987 (the year the authors
are using as a construction start date) it would be over $5
million. Recently the city had R. W. Beck Associates, a
transmission and sub-station engineering firm, prepare a
power line burial estimate. Beck estimated that, in 1985,
24
it would cost $3.8 million to bury the lines. Both the
American City Corporation study and the Codman Company study
state that removal of the power lines is essential if the
25
South Harbor site is to be developed.
Soil Composition
As noted earlier, South Harbor was filled with soil
removed from the bottom of Lynn Harbor. Because the site is
composed of fill, all buildings will have to be constructed
on pilings. The use of piles will add at least $4 per
26
square foot to hard construction costs. Based on the
preliminary program identified in the American City
Corporation study, a $4 per square foot premium on
construction costs will increase such costs by $4.6 million
for the commercial and hotel uses and $2.4 million for the
residential uses.
Seawall
The decaying seawall is another constraint that will be
costly to remedy. Estimates have shown that the cost of
repairing the 1,500 foot seawall will be approximately $2.5
27
million.
Landfill
Part of the South Harbor site is a landfill. Although
the director of the Lynn Office of Economic Development is
confident that the landfill is sanitary, director of city
planning, Kevin Geaney has reserved judgment until he sees
the results of a geotechnical study which the city has
commissioned from Geotechnical Engineers, Inc., a
geotechnical engineering firm, based in Winchester,
Massachusetts. Both officials note, however, that there is
likely to be a buildup of methane gas in the landfill since
that phenomena is common in landfill areas.
Geaney noted that Perini Construction Company is
currently using the slurry removed during construction of
Rowes Wharf in Boston to surcharge the landfill at no cost
to the city of Lynn. Surcharging is a process by which
methane is forced out of the landfill by the pressure of new
soil being placed on top of the fill. Geaney estimated that
if the city had had to pay for surcharging the site, it
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would have cost over $2 million. Although it is
difficult, until the Geotechnical Engineers study is
complete, to fully assess the magnitude of the landfill
constraint, it is correct to say that if the landfill were
"sanitary," it would not be a significant constraint to the
development of the South Harbor site.
Regional Access
One of the most serious site constraints, about which
little can be done, is Lynn's lack of regional access. The
city is not accessible from any of the three major highways
in the Boston area. (See Map Exhibit 2.) This constraint
will impact greatly on the number of visitors that could be
expected to support both hotel and office uses.
Image
As noted in the introduction, the city of Lynn suffers
from a poor public image. Its officials are often held out
as corrupt and incompetent in the media; the America East
saga, which has received substantial newspaper coverage,
does little to convince people otherwise. Although, the
city has, in recent years, launched a public relations
campaign to change the public's perception of Lynn, the
effect of this campaign is difficult to measure. Therefore,
to the extent that Lynn's image scares away reputable
private developers or, more importantly, potential users, it
must be considered a significant constraint to South
Harbor's development.
Site Assembly
The legal issues relating to the eminent domain case
discussed above represent another major constraint to
development. Although, in theory, the site assembly process
could be started before the eminent domain case is settled,
it is unlikely that any developer would embark on such a
course. It is difficult at this time, to predict what will
happen with the America East parcel; the LEDIC is unsure
whether it will appeal the court's land damage award and the
LEDIC has given no indication whether it would consider
another proposal by Nebelkopf or anyone else to buy out
Riley's interest in the site. In addition, it is unlikely
that the site assembly problems generated by the eminent
domain case will be the only site assembly problems a
developer will face, since the portion of the site not
affected by the eminent domain proceedings is privately
owned. Thus, site assembly looms as a major obstacle that
must be overcome before any active development can commence.
Assets
Although the constraints on South Harbor are severe,
the site does possess a number of features that are clearly
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assets with respect to future development. In particular
these assets are its accessibility to Logan Airport, its
waterfront location, its "gateway visibility" and its
proximity to General Electric's large Lynn operation.
Accessibility to Logan Airport
Even though Lynn is not easily accessible from major
regional highways such as Route 128 (Interstate 95), Route
93 or the Massachusetts Turnpike (Interstate 90), it can be
reached from Logan Airport in 15 minutes via a secondary
road known as the Lynnway (Route lA). Downtown Boston can
be reached from Lynn in approximately 20 minutes via the
Mystic Tobin Bridge. Lynn's unusual situation with respect
to accessibility - no regional access but excellent airport
access - has significant implications for the type of hotel
that could be successful on the South Harbor site. While
Lynn's lack of regional access precludes the development of
a hotel intended to serve the needs of suburban businesses,
its accessibility to Logan and to downtown Boston has led
the ACC analysts to conclude that a hotel with convention
facilities could be successful on the site.
Location
The South Harbor site has two positive locational
features. First, it is located right on the Lynnway and is
directly visible from the General Edwards Bridge, Lynn's
gateway from the south. This "gateway visibility" will help
attract passersby to the development and will make it easy
for them to access the site. Second, the site is situated
on the waterfront. Because undeveloped waterfront property
is so scarce these days, especially on the north shore of
Boston, South Harbor's waterfront location can only make the
site more attractive. ACC's analysts strongly recommend the
development of a marina, in conjunction with the residential
condominiums, to take advantage of boatowners' desires for
affordable slip facilities near their homes.
Proximity to General Electric
The General Electric company, located across the
Lynnway from South Harbor, is Lynn's largest employer having
over 7,000 people on its payroll. Recently the company
reaffirmed its commitment to remain in Lynn by beginning
construction in the city, of a $52 million robotics plant
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known as the "Factory of the Future." This new factory is
expected to require not only many new employees but also to
attract visitors worldwide who are interested in robotics.
The proximity of General Electric to the South Harbor site,
as well as the number of business people the company can be
expected to bring to Lynn, suggest the existence of support
for a mixed-use development at South Harbor.
Implications of Assets and Constraints for
the Development of the South Harbor Site
The foregoing discussion has highlighted the severe
constraints to development on the South Harbor site as well
as the major assets of the site. The site constraints that
can be overcome, such as the removal of the landfill and the
relocation of the power lines, will require a front-end
investment of over $8 million. These huge up-front costs
add substantial risks to developing the site and make it
likely that developing South Harbor will not work without
financial assistance from the public sector. Certainly, if
the city does commit a large amount of money to the project,
the city must take an active role in the process to protect
its investment of public funds.
Other constraints such as the sure-to-be-complicated
site assemblage process, are likely to be solved only if the
public sector actively assembles the land. When site
assembly cannot be accomplished by an ordinary purchase and
sale procedures, the public sector is often required to use
its powers of eminent domain if it wants to secure a site.
In the case of the South Harbor site, therefore, where the
ownership of the land is divided among three different
entities and where there are substantial legal problems
which involve 25% of the site, it is likely that Lynn will
have to take an active role in securing the site for a
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developer.
The city is, in fact, already involved with
approximately 36 acres of the site, by virtue of the LEDIC's
obligation to pay the power companies $1.6 million. At this
point, the LEDIC has to take some action with respect to
paying the award, which actively involves the LEDIC with the
site whether or not they want to be actively involved in a
development effort. In addition, to the extent that the
LEDIC hopes to use future revenues from South Harbor's
development to recoup this $1.6 million, it has every
incentive to do all that is can to make the project a
success.
Lynn's role cannot, however, be limited to site
assembly. Rather, the city will have to involve itself
actively throughout the entire development process. This
continuous involvement is necessary because substantial
development constraints on the site increase the overall
risk that the project will not be the first-class, high-
quality project that the city so badly wants or that it will
not be financially successful.
The city cannot afford another failure similar in
proportion to the Richard Riley and America East fiasco. In
that case, the city did not take an active role in the
development process; it used its powers of eminent domain to
take 70 acres of land from the Massachusetts Electric
Company and the New England Power Company and then turned
the land over to Riley, without retaining any control over
26
the site or project. When Riley could not turn his vision
of a marine industrial park into a reality, he went broke,
and the city lost any chance of being reimbursed for the
$1.6 million land damage award it was required to pay to the
power companies. The land lay barren for seven years; the
city collected little, if any, of the taxes due on the
property and the unfavorable media coverage of these
happenings did substantial damage to Lynn's already poor
image.
Another reason why the city will have to take an active
part in the development of South Harbor is to ensure that
its officials have sufficient design control and review
powers to ensure that their "gateway" site is developed in a
first-class, high quality manner. Strip or piece-meal
development would only perpetuate Lynn's image as a second
class city.
Chapter two, which follows, analyzes whether Lynn
officials are capable of assuming the active role that the
development of South Harbor will requires.
Chapter Two: The City's Ability to
Assume an Active Role in the Development Process
Having concluded in chapter one that the South Harbor
project cannot succeed without active, public sector
involvement, this chapter evaluates whether the city of Lynn
is capable of successfully assuming such a role. In
particular, this analysis looks for evidence that Lynn
officials are able to negotiate good disposition and
development agreements and are able to insulate, as much as
possible, the development process from the political
process, so that projects are not stopped or slowed down due
to new administrations or other bureaucratic idiosyncracies.
Evidence is also sought that city officials are flexible and
willing to renegotiate agreements when situations change.
The analysis of Lynn's ability to engineer the South
Harbor development process, proceeds in three parts. In the
first part, Lynn's governmental structure is examined. This
section describes the functions and authority of relevant
city officials and departments and the way in which these
officials and departments interact formally. In part two,
the informal network of communication and decision-making,
with respect to development, is examined. This section
draws on information obtained in interviews with various
city officials as well as on an examination of the city's
role in Lynn's only other large-scale, public-private
venture, Seaport Landing/Heritage Park Harbor. Part three
uses the findings discussed in parts one and two, to draw
conclusions about the city's ability to structure the South
Harbor development process.
Official Development-Related Entities
There are basically seven official entities in Lynn
that are significantly involved in downtown development.
These entities are the mayor, the city council, the Planning
Department, the Department of Community Development (DCD),
the Lynn Office of Economic Development (LOED), and the Lynn
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Economic Development and Industrial Corporation (LEDIC).
The city of Lynn has a mayor and council form of
government. Both the mayor and the councilors serve two-
year terms. There are eleven councilors, four of whom are
elected at large and seven of whom are elected by wards.
Current mayor, Antonio "Tony" Marino first assumed that
position in 1971 when Mayor Pasquale Caggiano passed away.
Marino, a former union organizer, was serving as Caggiano's
administrative assistant and finished out his term. Marino
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ran for his first full term in 1972 and was defeated. In
1975, however, he campaigned successfully and has served as
Lynn's mayor continuously since that date. He is up for
reelection in November of this year and, to date, faces
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three challengers.
Marino views the mayor's powers as rather weak because
the city council, not the mayor, appoints many of the
29
significant city officials such as the city solicitor, the
tax collector, the treasurer, and the auditor. In addition,
the city council must approve many of the appointments the
mayor does have the authority to make. Marino also sees the
two-year term of office as detracting from the mayor's power
because it makes stability and continuity in government much
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harder to attain.
The Director of City Planning is elected by the members
of the Planning Board who, in turn, are appointed by the
mayor, subject to city council approval. Kevin Geaney, the
current director has held the position since 1976. The
planning department serves as the primary zoning authority
for the city. It is the planning board that determines the
appropriate zoning for all property in Lynn. The city has
what is commonly known as a pyramid zoning system; higher
uses are permitted in areas zoned for lesser (more noxious)
uses. However, city council approval is required to develop
a property with a higher use than that for which it is
zoned. If such a request is turned down by the council
there is little the applicant can do. Lynn's Board of
Zoning Appeals (the members of which are appointed by the
mayor) has a very narrow scope of authority and is limited
to dealing with dimensional issues such as side-yard and set
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back requirements.
The Department of Community Development is headed by
Executive Director Edward Calnan, who is appointed by the
mayor sans council approval. Calnan has held this post
since 1975. The DCD is a block grant agency that is
involved in rehabilitating neighborhood housing, parks and
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playgrounds.
The Lynn Office of Economic Development is charged with
bringing businesses to Lynn. William Kyriakakis is the
director of this office and Peter DeVeau serves as deputy
director. Kyriakakis was former director Robert Baker's
assistant for many years. When Baker left to take a job in
the private sector, Marino appointed Kyriakakis to replace
him. Kyriakakis also serves as executive director of the
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Lynn Economic Development and Industrial Corporation.
The Lynn Economic Development and Industrial
Corporation was formed in 1977 via state legislation. This
legislation, Chapter 778 of the Massachusetts General Laws,
gives the LEDIC eminent domain powers, although any exercise
of these powers is subject to the approval of the mayor and
city council. Chapter 778 requires that the composition of
the LEDIC board include at least one member experienced in
financial matters, at least one member experienced in real
estate matters and at least one member experienced in
municipal government. All LEDIC members are appointed by
the mayor subject to city council confirmation. LEDIC board
members select their executive director who signs a three-
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year contract with the city.
Because Lynn has seven development-related entities,
all charged with implementing the city's development
policies, opportunities abound for various departments to
miscommunicate or disagree. Such miscommunication or
disagreement can delay or even stop development projects.
Also, because the city council retains the ultimate
decision-making authority for most development-related
issues, development plans made by Lynn's agencies, offices
and departments can always be turned down by a majority of
the city council. There is no evidence, however, that the
city's complicated formal structure presents such problems
for Lynn officials. Basically, they manage to minimize the
potential for miscommunication and city council disagreement
through the existence of an informal communication network,
known as the "development cabinet," which is discussed
below.
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The Unofficial Decision-Makers
Every Tuesday morning Calnan, Geaney and Kyriakakis
meet with Mayor Marino to brief him on all development
projects with which the city is involved. Geaney and Marino
refer to this group as the "development cabinet" and explain
that it functions successfully as a facilitator of
communication and cooperation among the various departments
and offices its members represent. In general Marino leaves
the technical details for his "cabinet" members to deal with
while he concentrates on lobbying for state and federal
funds. Work among offices is often divided according to
individual preferences and expertise.
Seaport Landing
In order to illustrate how the "cabinet" functions, its
role in Lynn's other large scale public-private development
will be examined. Known as the Seaport Landing/Heritage
Park Harbor Project (Seaport Landing), this large-scale
development is a mixed-use development which, when
completed, will contain a waterfront park, a marina, and 120
luxury condominiums.
Genesis of Seaport Landing
The development cabinet was the driving force behind
the development of Seaport Landing; if its members had not
taken the active, entrepreneurial role that they did take,
the project would never have come about. Cabinet members
Calnan, Kyriakakis, Geaney and Marino had long ago
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inventoried the city's major resources and decided to
focus their attention on developing the waterfront and
revitalizing the downtown. Geaney, who had followed the
public-private projects that were helping to revitalize
Lowell, became aware that the Dukakis administration was
pleased with the success of the state funded Heritage Park
in Lowell and had decided to fund several other Heritage
Parks in cities similar to Lowell. After Geaney identified
a site that he felt to be appropriate for a Heritage Park
development, the project "went into the cabinet, and
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Community Development picked up the ball." Cabinet
members decided collectively that Calnan would be the
contact person required by the Commonwealth during the
application process.
Site Assemblage
Because the city did not own the site that Geaney had
identified for the Seaport Landing project, the LEDIC
exercised its powers of eminent domain to take the property.
The money to pay for the site was provided by the
Commonwealth's Department of Environmental Management.
Because the state funds provided to pay for the site were
only provided as part of the Commonwealth's commitment to
fund the Heritage Park project, such funds would not be
available to relieve the LEDIC of its obligation to the
power companies.
Developer Selection
Eventually the city, through its Department of
Community Development, put out a request for proposals (RFP)
for that part of the site that was to be privately
developed. This request was prepared in consultation with
Sasaki Associates, a land planning firm based in Watertown,
Massachusetts. The RFP for Seaport Landing established
fairly strict development guidelines and proposal submission
requirements for the project's development, although it
noted that a private developer could "suggest modification
to both the physical and programmatic guidelines based on
his own assumptions regarding construction cost, marketing
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and financing." The criteria for developer selection
included the requirement that the developer be financially
responsible and have the resources necessary to carry out
the project. The developer's track record with similar
projects and the excellence and appropriateness of his
design concept were also mentioned as important selection
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criteria. Three developers responded to this RFP.
Although the LEDIC was officially responsible for
developer selection, the development cabinet played a
critical role in the selection process. Cabinet members
went so far as to interview respondents' prospective
lenders, to determine for themselves whether the lender was
truly prepared to commit to the project if their prospective
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client won the designation. Officially, the LEDIC chose
Nebelkopf as the city's private partner. Unofficially, the
development cabinet made the decision. (As noted
previously, Nebelkopf is currently trying to win designation
to develop the South Harbor site.)
According to Kyriakakis, the LEDIC designated Nebelkopf
as developer because it felt that his proposal "was the
better proposal overall [in design and what it would
ultimately do for the city]." He notes that Nebelkopf did
not have the deepest pockets of the three developers who
responded and that the decision was definitely not based on
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the financial strength of the developers. DeVeau adds
that the other two candidates joined together at the last
minute, on the night that all three candidates were to be
interviewed for the second time, and merged their proposals.
The resultant proposal was incomplete and disorganized and
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helped influence the LEDIC's decision to select Nebelkopf.
Development Agreement
In May 1982, the LEDIC, chaired at the time by Brian
Magrane, entered a land disposition agreement with Nebelkopf
and his organization, Seaport Development Associates, a
Massachusetts limited partnership. This agreement specified
that Nebelkopf and his partner, Harold Stavisky, would
indemnify the LEDIC from 23% of any costs the LEDIC incurred
in taking Phase One of the Seaport Landing site and from
100% of any costs the LEDIC incurred in taking Phase Two of
that site. The agreement specified that $259.9 thousand
represented 23% of a pro tanto eminent domain award for the
Phase One parcel, which covered 1.5 acres of the total 3.8-
acre site.
In the minds of development cabinet members, this
disposition agreement not only specified how the land was to
be acquired and transferred to Nebelkopf but also served as
a development agreement, setting out Nebelkopf's development
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responsibilities. With respect to its function as a
development agreement, the document leaves much to be
desired. It imposes no completion schedule on the
developer, requiring only that he perform "professionally,"
and contains no penalty provision for untimely or
unsatisfactory performance. In addition, it does not set
out specific development responsibilities for either
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party.
According to Geaney, however, the city did control the
development's progress, although he admits that the controls
did not appear explicitly in the development agreement.
Geaney states that he came up with a system whereby the
developer was given only enough land in Phase One of the
project to put up buildings and not enough to put in the
necessary parking for these buildings. No certificate of
occupancy can issue for Phase One buildings unless adequate
parking is provided. In order to provide this parking,
though, the developer needs Parcel Two. Thus, the developer
must take down the land for Phase Two before Phase One can
be occupied. To the extent that this "system," devised by
Geaney and agreed to by the development cabinet, provides
incentives for the developer to finish promptly, it has some
merit, although Geaney, DeVeau and Marino readily admit that
subsequent development agreements should and will be more
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explicit.
The disposition and development agreement for the
America East site, was executed in 1978 when the city had
even less experience with such agreements than it did when
the Seaport Landing agreement was signed in 1982. The
America East agreement, like the Seaport Landing agreement,
has been criticized for not providing any mechanism by
which the city could ensure that development of the site
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proceeded as envisioned. Geaney claims that the agreement
is not as one-sided as it appears. He argues that the city
maintained substantial control over development on the site
by not changing the site's heavy industrial zoning
classification.
Geaney reasons that by maintaining the property's heavy
industrial classification, the cabinet ensured that
development on the America East site, for any purpose other
than an industrial one would have to be approved by the city
council. Since the Planning Department's recommendation is
arrived at only after all members of the development cabinet
agree, and since the city council rarely goes against a
Planning Department recommendation, the cabinet is able to
exert substantial influence over what is ultimately
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developed on the site.
Geaney's argument is true as far as it goes. Any
development that will occur on the South Harbor site will be
controlled officially by the city council and unofficially
by the development cabinet. His argument, however, does not
answer the criticism with respect to the Riley proposal.
Since Riley planned to develop the site in accordance with
its heavy industrial zoning classification, the city council
would not have to approve of any plans for the site. As
noted previously, council approval is only required when a
developer desires to build a project which is not permitted
on that site by the city's zoning ordinance. Thus, the only
control the city could exercise over Riley's development was
that which the land disposition and development agreement
specified. As noted above, the agreement contained no such
provisions.
All officials note that the seeming one-sidedness of
the aforementioned disposition agreements, particularly the
America East document, must be viewed in context. When
Riley approached the city in 1977 with his marine industrial
park idea, Congress was discussing the possibilty of
imposing a 200-mile offshore limit for foreign fishing
vessels and the Economic Development Administration planned
to implement programs that would provide grants to pay for
the infrastructure required to develop on-shore fishing
related industries. In addition, the Commerce Department
appeared ready to provide subsidies to the operators of
marine related industries. In 1977, Lynn's economy was in
bad shape and nobody was investing money downtown. In this
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context, Riley's proposal looked good.
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Public Sector's Role During Development
The city's commitment to and active involvement in the
Seaport Landing project did not diminish after the developer
was designated. The city, via its development cabinet, took
an active role in design review and agreement renegotiation.
According to DeVeau, the city maintained design control
because Nebelkopf, by responding to the RFP, implicitly
agreed to submit to design review by the city. Although the
city and Nebelkopf never executed any formal agreement to
spell out who would represent the city in the design review
process, and how that process would work, there is no
evidence that this lack of a formal agreement caused
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problems, for either Nebelkopf or the city.
Geaney, Calnan and Kyriakakis reviewed the designs and
made recommendations to the city council as to which designs
should be approved. The city council followed their
recommendations, as usual, although it was not obliged to do
54
so.
When situations arose that required changes in designs
already approved, Nebelkopf and the development cabinet
renegotiated. After they had reached agreement on what
changes were to occur, the cabinet presented the results of
the negotiation to the city council. Without exception, the
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city council approved the cabinet's suggested changes.
The first phase of Seaport Landing was completed on
schedule earlier this year. The 65 condominiums built in
the first phase have been sold at prices which average $134
per square foot. Although development cabinet members are
not entirely pleased with the final design of the
condominiums, they are, on the whole, pleased with the rest
of the project; certainly, it is financial success.
The City's Ability to take an
Active Role in the Development Process
The foregoing examination of the entities in Lynn that
regulate development, and of the informal networking that
ties these organizations together, highlights the city's
strengths and weaknesses with respect to its ability to take
an active role in the development process when that role is
required to make a project work.
Strengths
Broadly stated, Lynn's strengths are its continuity of
government, its experienced officials and their contacts
with state legislators, and its "development cabinet."
Lynn's greatest strength is its continuity of
personnel. In fact, it is from this continuity that many of
Lynn's other strengths derive. For example, the development
cabinet functions effectively largely because its members
have worked together for some time. Continuity has also
made it possible for city officials to gain experience in
the real estate arena, to cultivate contacts with state and
federal officials and to be exposed to a variety of
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development projects.
Arguably, there are threats to this continuity. Would
the status quo change if Marino were not re-elected in
November, and if so, how? Will it be harder for the city to
obtain state funds for its projects now that Thomas McGee is
no longer Speaker of the House? When will the eminent
domain suit against the power companies finally be resolved
and what will be the result?
Lynn's biannual mayoral election will take place during
November of this year. At this point it is impossible to
predict the outcome of the election. The authors believe,
however, that no matter what the outcome in November,
Geaney, Calnan, Kyriakakis and DeVeau will retain their
respective positions. Kyriakakis' contract with the city
will be renewed in August 1985 for three years and both
Calnan and Geaney have survived changes in administrations
before. Both Calnan and Geaney are longtime Lynn residents
and control a significant number of votes via extended
family and friends.
Another of the city's strengths is the collective
experience of Marino, Calnan, Kyriakakis, DeVeau and Geaney.
All of these individuals, who currently hold elected or
appointed office, have been involved with development in
Lynn for over ten years. This group of people has been
responsible for bringing over $42 million of state and
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federal funding into the city during the past 10 years.
They possess the technical skills necessary to see a
development through from conception to completion as their
experience with Seaport Landing proves.
During their lengthy terms in office, Lynn officials
have cultivated contacts with numerous state legislators.
Most notable among these legislators is Thomas McGee, the
democratic representative from Lynn who served as Speaker of
the House for many years until 1984. Marino and Geaney are
quick to acknowledge that the "McGee connection" often
helped Lynn get its requests for state funds and other
assistance reviewed. Neither Marino nor Geaney, however,
believe that McGee's recent departure will make it
substantially more difficult for the city to obtain state
funds because they have been careful to cultivate good
relationships with other influential politicians. For
example, Marino, a former president of the Massachusetts
Mayors Association and member of the Massachusetts Municipal
Association, is a longtime Dukakis supporter. In addition,
the majority whip of the Massachusetts Senate, Walter J.
Boverini, resides in Lynn. Also, a Lynn-area representative
supported McGee's opponent, George Kevarian, in his effort
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to remove McGee as Speaker of the House.
The authors consider the development cabinet both a
strength and a weakness of the city. The negative aspects
of the development cabinet will be considered in the
following subsection. The positive aspects of the
development cabinet are that it promotes cooperation among
key development-related entities and minimizes duplication
of effort. As noted previous
cabinet exerts substantial
development. Cabinet members
ongoing and future projects.
ensure that deadlines are met,
for funding. In addition, they
organization represented in the
any other member organization.
are settled before they ta
ly, the informal development
control over downtown
meet every week to discuss
These regular meetings help
particularly for applications
ensure that the work of each
cabinet is not duplicated by
Disagreements among members
any action and, to the
"outside" world, they present a united front. This
decision-by-consensus method lowers the risk to a private
developer that a proposal approved by one city agency will
be rejected by another. As discussed below, however, it
cannot guarantee a developer that a proposal approved by the
cabinet will be approved by the city council.
Weaknesses
The city's three major weaknesses are (1) the fact that
it suffers from a persistent problem, (2) the fact that the
city council is empowered with the authority to make many
development-related decisions and (3) the fact that the
development cabinet believes that, regardless of the size or
scope of a project, their informal method of project control
will get the city what it wants and what cabinet members
deem best for the city and authority.
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As noted previously, the media has often portrayed Lynn
officials as granting developers political favors. This
image of political favoritism may have been projected to the
development community via the Seaport Landing developer
selection process. Because the Lynn officials did not
select a developer based on the selection criteria specified
in the Seaport Landing RFP, outsiders reasonably could have
viewed the designation decision as arbitrary. Such a
perception by the development community, could discourage
developers from seeking designation to develop South Harbor.
Lynn's zoning system, discussed in part one of this
chapter, gives the city council substantial control over
what a developer can build on the South Harbor site. As
noted previously, the council must approve proposals for any
development that does not conform with the current zoning
status of a site even if the proposed use is a "higher" one
than that which is permitted. Although the city council has
never unilaterally gone against a development cabinet
recommendation, since Marino has been in office, there is no
guarantee that the council will continue to follow cabinet
recommendations. To the extent that the council disregards
the development cabinet's recommendations, the city council
controls the site program. Because this system invests the
city, in particular the city council, with so much control
over the final program for the South Harbor site, a
sophisticated developer will probably not want to risk
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having the council reject a proposal in which he has
invested substantial amounts of time and money. Even if he
has the support of the development cabinet, which support
the authors consider extremely important, the risk of city
council rejection exists.
Even though the development cabinet has worked
successfully to coordinate the city's many development-
related entities and to successfully complete the Seaport
Landing project, it could very well hurt the city's chances
of seeing a well-designed, financially successful project,
developed at South Harbor, if its members insist on
controlling the development process too informally. Any
development on South Harbor would be far larger than the
Seaport Landing project; South Harbor covers 56 acres and
the privately developed portion of Seaport Landing covers
less than 4 acres. South Harbor would take much longer to
complete than did Seaport Landing and would, therefore,
require the city to maintain control of the project for many
years, through changes in personnel and elected officials.
Even if the city's method of controlling the development
process had worked perfectly in the case of Seaport Landing
- which it did not - there is little reason to believe that
it could work as well with a project as large as South
Harbor.
The authors conclude that the city of Lynn has much to
offer a private developer interested in developing the South
Harbor site. If members of the development cabinet are
willing to change their rather informal style of controlling
the development process, then there is no reason to think
that the city would not be a capable public sector partner
in the development of South Harbor. The city has an
excellent track record in obtaining state and federal monies
and has shown, through its involvement in Seaport Landing,
that Lynn can successfully take an active and
entrepreneurial role in the development process.
Chapter Three: The Feasibility of the Program
Recommended for the Site
An analysis of South Harbor's constraints, in chapter
one, led to the conclusion that the development of South
Harbor can only occur if the public sector takes an active
part in developing the site. The preceding chapter examined
Lynn's methods for regulating and encouraging development in
the city, and determined that city officials do have the
ability to act entrepreneurially, when the situation calls
such actions. This chapter turns away from the earlier
focus on the city and analyzes the feasibility of the
program proposed for the site by the American City
Corporation. This analysis is presented in two parts. Part
one discusses financial feasibility. The impact on the
project's feasibility, of changes in critical parameters,
such as public and private financing, project phasing and
operating revenues, is explored through pro forma analysis.
Part two discusses the market feasibility of the program.
The ACC study is examined to determine whether the program
it recommended for the site represents the best program for
the site, or whether other programs would be more
appropriate.
Financial Feasibility
The financial feasibility analysis which follows seeks
to answer three questions. First, can the program suggested
for the South Harbor site, by the American City Corporation
(ACC), support itself at build-out? Second, assuming the
project can be made to support itself at build-out, can a
first phase of the development carry the huge, up-front,
infrastructure investment that is necessary? Third, if
private financing alternatives cannot make the project work,
what financial assistance could the public sector provide to
make the program feasible? The authors designed a computer
model to evaluate the impact on project feasibility of
changes in critical parameters such as public and private
debt and equity financing, project phasing and operating
revenues. A conclusion is reached that the project is
infeasible unless operating revenues can be increased
substantially and unless private and public sector financial
support can be obtained.
Project Feasibility at Build-Out
The issue of whether the project can support itself at
build-out is basically a question of whether or not the
project's projected revenues exceed the amortization of the
project's projected development and operating costs, by an
amount large enough to attract developers. In order to
answer this question, the authors generated a series of pro
formas based on the program recommended to the city by the
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American City Corporation. This program is outlined
below:
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HOTEL
o 350 guest rooms
o $45-$65 per night room rate
o 10,000-20,000 square feet of public/meeting room
OFFICE
o 500,000-700,000 square feet of net leasable area
o $18-$25 per square foot rental rate
RESIDENTIAL
o 350-500 luxury residential condominiums
o $150,000-$200,000 per unit (approximately $150
per square foot)
RETAIL
o 10,000-12,000 square feet of gross leasable area
o 5-8 small, sevice-oriented establishments
In generating the pro formas for this feasibility
analysis, the authors made several basic, conservative
assumptions regarding revenues and costs. These assumptions
are thoroughly documented and presented in Exhibit A. A
separate feasibility study was performed for each proposed
use to determine whether each use could stand alone if
project phasing or a changing economy were to require that
it support itself for some period of time. These studies
are labeled in the appendix as Hotel, Office (which includes
retail), and Residential Exhibits. Infrastructure costs are
allocated to each use on the basis of each use's total
buildable square footage as a percentage of the project's
total buildable square footage. Table One on the following
page presents a summary of the project's development costs.
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Table One
Summary of Development Costs
From the ACC Study at Build-Out
Development Costs
Land Acquisition*
Hotel
Office
Residential
% of Total
% of Total Development
Development Cost for
Cost for Entire
Costs Each Use Program
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------
$2,390,343 7.00% 23.00%
$4,671,000 6.00% 45.00%
$3,258,260 7.00% 32.00%
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -------
$10,319,603 100.00%
Site Improvements**
Hotel
Office
Residential
$2,228,878 7.00% 23.00%
$4,457,757 6.00% 45.00%
$3,165,038 6.00% 32.00%
-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------
$9,851,673 100.00%
Building
Improvements***
Hotel
Office
Residential
Soft Costs****
Hotel
Office
Residential
TOT. DEVELOPMENT
COSTS
$24,150,000 75.00% 19.00%
$63,540,000 85.00% 50.00%
$39,700,000 81.00% 31.00%
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----------
$127,390,000 100.00%
$3,573,365 11.00% 44.00%
$1,760,000 2.00% 22.00%
$2,732,785 6.00% 34.00%
-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----------
$8,066,150 100.00%
$155,627,426
* Land Acquisition: Includes price for land, closing, and
legal costs;
** Site Improvements: Includes powerline burial, road
construction, landfill removal, and seawall repair;
*** Building Improvements: Includes all pile construction,
FF&E for the Hotel, and the amenities for the
Residential;
**** Soft Costs: Includes overhead, interest payments,
financial fees, architectural commissions, etc.
A gross determination of feasibility, exclusive of
debt, was made by comparing what the project would cost to
build, with what the project would be worth: the difference
representing the development value created by the project.
This gross feasibility determination compared the
capitalized values of the hotel and office components, with
the cost of building each of them, by capitalizing, at a
standard rate, their respective stabilized year, income
stream. The analysis indicated that the project in gross
terms (without debt) is infeasible for the hotel and office
components at build-out. Only the residential component
creates value. Table Two presents the result of this gross
feasibility analysis.
Table Two
Gross Feasibility Analysis
Difference between the Capitalized Values
And the Costs to Build the Entire Program
Cost to Capitalized Value
USE Build Value Created
----------------------------------------------
Hotel $32,342,600 $19,380,300 ($12,962,300)
Office $74,428,800 $67,191,700 ( $7,237,100)
Residential $52,114,300 $84,000,000 * $31,885,700
* The Capitalized value for the residential is the total
sales revenue.
As Table Two above indicates, the project's anticipated
revenue stream can not justify what the project would cost
to build. This gap between anticipated revenues and building
costs means that a lender will not finance 100% of the
project. In order to determine how much of the project he
would finance, a lender will look at several common
financial indicators such as debt coverage ratio and cost on
cost return. Most lenders consider the debt coverage ratio
the primary, rule-of-thumb, criteria for underwriting a
59
loan and usually require a coverage ratio of 110% to 125%
before they will commit to financing hotel or office space.
In addition, they look for a cost on cost return of at least
15%. Table Three below, presents a summary of these
indicators for all the project components at buildout.
USE
Hotel
Office
Residential
Table Three
Financial Feasibility Indicators
For the Project at Build-out
Debt Coverage Cash on
Ratio Cost Return
58.51% 8.99%
77.38% 10.05%
61.50%
As the results in Table Three indicate, the hotel, as
proposed, and with slightly over 22.5% of the infrastructure
costs allocated to it, is not feasible. The rate of return
on capital investment, (ROR), is well below the typical rate
of 15%. In addition, even though the hotel's 35% gross
operating profit as a percentage of total sales exceeds the
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30% standard in the industry (See Hotel Exhibit 3), the
hotel's debt coverage ratio is well below the minimum
percentage required to obtain financing; it cannot, in fact,
generate net operating income sufficient to cover its debt
service. Even if none of the infrastructure costs are
allocated to the hotel, these returns barely improve. Debt
coverage only increases to 68% and cost on cost only
increases to 10.44%. (See Hotel Exhibit 8).
The office pro forma, calculated for the entire 700,000
square feet, programmed by ACC, includes the small component
of retail space. The results of the analysis indicate that
the office component is also not feasible. At the currently
programmed rental rate of $18 per square foot, and with 40%
of the infrastructure costs allocated to it, Table Three
shows that the office component's debt coverage ratio only
reaches 77% and the value of the office component, in its
stabilized year, does not equal its cost. (See Office
Exhibit 5).
On the other hand, the residential component of the
South Harbor project is quite profitable. At build-out the
500 condominiums and 300 boat slips gross $67 thousand on a
per condominium basis and yield over a 65% return on
investment before taxes. (See Residential Exhibit 2).
The results of the analysis presented in Table Three
and in the Appendix show that the South Harbor project is
infeasible as programmed. The project costs too much to
build, given its projected revenue stream.
While the residential component can clearly support
itself at build-out, neither the office component nor the
hotel component can do so. Table Four below highlights the
hotel and office deficits that must be eliminated for the
project to become feasible at build-out. These deficits
represent the difference between the cost of each
component's development and the maximum debt service each
component can support. They can also be thought of as
representing the amount of equity required to make each
component feasible.
These deficits were derived as follows. First, in each
case, the debt coverage ratio was fixed at 110%, the lowest
ratio a lender would accept to finance such a deal. Second,
the maximum possible debt service payments that could be
supported, at current financing costs and with a 110%
coverage ratio, were calculated. Third, the size of the
permanent loan that these payments could support, assuming
they were to be amortized over thirty years, was determined
by calculating the present value of this stream of payments.
This present value figure equals the maximum supportable
permanent loan. Subtracting the amount of the hotel's or
the offices's permanent loan from their respective
development costs, gives the amount of equity required to
fund their respective deficits.
Table Four
Debt the Project Can Support at Build-Out
Debt Equity
Max. as a Deficit as a
Debt %of to be % of
Total Project Tot. Elim. Total
Project Can Proj. by Proj.
Cost ** Support* Cost Equity Cost
-------------------------------------------------------
Hotel
$32,342,586 $17,117,283 43% $15,225,304 47%
Office
$74,428,756 $51,329,528 69% $23,099,229 31%
* The Debt Coverage Ratio is fixed at 110% in the
Stabilized Yr. for each use in order to calculate
Maximum debt the Project can support.
** Infrastructure is allocated upon Gross Leasable square
footage.
Private Sector: Methods to Make the Project Feasible
at Build-Out
There are a number of private sector financing methods
that could help raise the equity necessary to make the
project feasible at build-out. This section discusses three
common methods: increasing the project's revenue stream,
selling the project's cash flow and tax benefits via
syndication and financing the project's deficit through
the sale industrial revenue bonds. Because the hotel is so
important to the development of South Harbor, from Lynn's
perspective, the following in-depth analysis of these
alternatives has been limited to the hotel component of the
program only.
Revenue Stream
Because inflation makes it possible for a developer to
raise room or rental rates above those reflected in his
original pro forma, it can often save a project with returns
that may not, otherwise, justify investment because the
revenue stream cannot cover the project's development and
operating costs. Thus, reliance on inflation to increase
revenues is one option for eliminating the South Harbor
hotel deficit.
Even though the pro formas based upon the ACC program
included an inflation adjustment of 6% per annum, this
adjustment was not sufficient to eliminate the hotel
deficit. In order to eliminate this deficit and to maintain
a debt coverage ratio of at least 110%, room rates at the
hotel would have to be raised from the currently programmed
rate of $65 per night to $125 per night. (See Hotel Exhibit
8). This rate is comparable to the rates of many first-
class hotels in Boston, such as the Marriott at Copley Place
and the Back Bay Hilton. There is no data to indicate that
the market in Lynn could support such a rate especially with
an inflation rate that is currently less than 6% per year.
The authors conclude that reliance on inflation to increase
revenues will not eliminate the hotel's deficit.
Syndication
A more realistic option for making the hotel feasible
is syndication. Syndication is a vehicle by which
developers raise up-front equity by selling portions of a
project's projected cash flow, tax benefits and residuals to
investors, known as limited partners. Typically a limited
partner pays in his investment over five years and receives
his returns over a period of ten to fifteen years. Limited
partner investors currently look for an investment to yield
at least an 18% internal rate of return. A portion of his
investment goes toward paying a 10% processing fee and a 4%
fee to the developer.
As Table Four above shows, approximately $15.225
million of equity, which represents 47% of the hotel's total
development costs, would have to be raised by syndication,
if the room rates are to remain at the currently programmed
rate of $65 per night. A syndication to raise this $15.225
million was simulated and the results of this simulation are
presented in Hotel Exhibit 9. When room rates remain at $65
per night and 100% of the project is allocated to the
limited partners, the internal rate of return to the
investors is only 1.3%, a figure far below their desired
return of 18%. To explore the possibility of syndication
further, a sensitivity analysis was performed which varies
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room rate and the percentage of the project sold to the
limited partners as a function of the project's internal
rate of return. The results of this analysis indicate that,
if the developer keeps at least 10% of the project, an 18%
return to investors cannot be achieved unless room rates are
raised to $105 per night. At that combination, 90% of the
deal must be sold to the investors. As stated earlier, the
authors believe that room rate is not a variable that can be
raised arbitrarily, without market justification, to make
the numbers work.
Industrial Revenue Bonds
Another possibility for making the hotel feasible at
build-out is to use industrial revenue bonds, (IRBs), to
finance the deficit. IRBs are attractive to investors
because the interest received on the investment is not
taxable. Because they are tax-exempt, these bonds can be
marketed at lower interest rates. The current rate on such
bonds is around 10%. The bonds function essentially as a
secured loan for the buyers of the bonds; the developer
makes regular payments of interest and principal to the
them.
In order to explore the IRB financing option, the 13%
interest rate assumed in the base case for the permanent
loan, was reduced to 10% and the pro-forma was recalculated.
The results of this simulation indicate that, even with IRB
financing, room rates would have to be raised to $110 per
night, for the project to meet the debt coverage, the cost
on cost and the valuation-to-cost criteria set forth
earlier. As noted previously, an in-depth market analysis
would have to be performed to determine whether such room
rates could be supported in Lynn. The authors believe that
they could not.
In addition, the South Harbor site currently is not
eligible for industrial revenue bond financing in
Massachusetts, because IRBs cannot be issued for commercial
uses unless these uses are located in a designated and
approved Commercial Area Revitalization, (CAR), district.
In order for the site to be designated as a CAR district,
the Commonwealth's Executive Office of Communities and
Development must declare the area "decadent, open, and
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blighted."
Although the discussion above focused on the hotel
component of the project, the office component faces
feasibility problems at build-out also. The authors'
analysis, however, indicates that the office components
problems are not as severe as those of the hotel. The
office component's deficit of $23 million represents 31% of
its total development costs, as compared to the 47%
represented by the hotel's $15.2 million deficit. In
addition, the rental rate necessary to fund the entire
office deficit - $24 per square foot - represents only a 33%
increase over the programmed rate of $18 per square foot, as
opposed to the nearly 100% increase in room rates necessary
to eliminate the hotel's deficit. Nevertheless, more market
research would have to be performed before the developer
could rely on an increase in rental rates to make the
project feasible.
Syndication and IRB financing are more realistic
possibilities for funding the deficit and should be
explored, just as they were for the hotel.
The Infrastructure Problem
Even if the project can be made feasible at build-out,
by eliminating the hotel and office deficits, there remains
the question of whether the first phase of the project can
carry the entire project's infrastructure costs. This
question arises because the major infrastructure
improvements, such as power line burial and landfill
removal, must be completed in their entirety during phase
one of the development. Therefore, even though the cost of
these improvements can and should be apportioned among the
various uses to analyze the project's feasibility at build-
out, the funds to pay for these improvements must be
generated during the project's first phase. If the project
works at build-out, which is assumed in this section, the
need to fund the infrastructure improvements up front is
simply a cash flow problem, albeit a significant one.
To determine the magnitude of this cash flow problem it
is first necessary to identify the uses that will comprise
phase one of the project. To date there has been no phasing
proposal which expressly takes into account this cash flow
problem. The proposals which have been made, however, all
state that, for marketing purposes, the hotel must be
included in phase one. For example, the Codman study stated
that the hotel should be part of the first phase because it
will help project an early image of quality, excitement, and
action in the development, which is important to the luxury
condominium marketing effort. The city also has expressed a
strong desire to see the hotel in the first phase.
Therefore, for the purposes of the following discussion, the
authors assume that the hotel will be built in the first
phase of the project no matter what other uses are also
included.
In the feasibility-at-build-out analysis, the hotel was
allocated slightly over 22% of the total project's
infrastructure costs. As noted previously, this allocation
was based on the fact that the hotel's total square footage
was equal to slightly over 22% of the entire project's
square footage. For purposes of determining the magnitude
of the phase one cash flow problem, however, 100% of the
infrastructure costs were allocated to the hotel. Table
Five below indicates that the hotel's original deficit of
$15.2 million is increased to over $20 million by such an
allocation.
Table Five
Cash Flow Deficit for Phase One due to
Infrastructure Costs
Hotel deficit Additional project
with deficit with
22.58% Allocation with 100% Allocation
$15,225,304 $4,986,645
Private Sector: Phasing the Project as a Method for
Solving the Infrastructure Problem
As Table Five above points out, even if the hotel's $15
million deficit at build-out can be eliminated, the hotel
cannot generate the cash flow necessary to pay for the
project's infrastructure. Assuming, for the marketing
reasons discussed in the previous section, that the hotel
must be included in phase one, solving the first phase cash
flow problem requires a determination of what use(s) could
be built in conjunction with the hotel that would partially
or wholly eliminate the $5 million infrastructure-related
deficit.
Building the office component in phase one does not
help fund the $5 million cash flow deficit because the
office component itself requires $23 million of equity just
to make it feasible at build-out. As noted earlier, to fund
this $23 million equity gap, rental rates per square foot
would have to be increased substantially over the programmed
rate of $18 per square foot, regardless of what other
methods are also used. (See Office Exhibit 6). Funding the
additional $5 million infrastructure requirement would force
the rental rates to be increased even further which cannot
be justified by any market analyses done to date.
Unlike the office component, the luxury condominiums
and the marina can generate large amounts of cash which can
be used to fund the up-front infrastructure costs.
Condominiums are a great source of cash because any profit
they generate can be taken out immediately unlike, that of
an operating business. Because each unit produces a $67
thousand profit before tax, only 74 units, of the type
programmed, would have to be built in phase one to cover the
$5 million infrastructure deficit.
Another phasing option that may reduce the cash flow
deficit, as well as the operating deficit, is to build at
least a portion of all three uses - hotel, office and
residential - in the first phase. Market research has shown
that mixed-use developments cause a "market synergy." This
synegy reportedly creates an "address" for a site, which,
in turn, causes an increase in market penetration, that is
reflected in higher rent levels for each use than those that
would be obtained by any single use, standing alone. To the
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extent that the various uses programmed for South Harbor
react synergistically with one other to drive up office
rents, hotel room rates and condominium sales prices, this
option may increase the project's immediate revenue stream
over that which is projected, thereby reducing the deficits.
To make a substantial difference in these deficits, however,
the increases in rental rates, room rates and sales prices,
would have to be even greater than the substantial increases
necessary to eliminate the operating deficit alone. As the
feasibility-at-build-out section made clear, even these
increases cannot be justified by any current market data.
Thus, it is unlikely that any synergistic effect could raise
revenues enough to make any significant difference in either
operating or cash flow deficits.
Not only is it unlikely that any synergistic effect
could help eliminate project deficits, but also it is
unlikely that the South Harbor program could generate any
synergistic effect at all. Synergy is a phenomenum found in
well-programmed, mixed-use projects and, even though the
South Harbor program is considered a mixed-use program by
both the American City Corporation and the city of Lynn, it
is, in reality a multi-use program. The current South
Harbor program has a floor area ratio, (FAR), of .63, which
is well below the minimum mixed-use FAR of 3.
The Public Sector: Methods for Funding Infrastructure
Deficit and for Making the Project Feasible
at Build-Out
As the previous sections make clear, the ACC program
for South Harbor, suffers from massive operating and cash
flow deficits, which are not likely to be eliminated by
private sector funding alone. Therefore, because the public
sector will probably be asked to provide the project with
financial support, this section discusses two common methods
which the public sector often uses to finance development
projects that can not be entirely funded by the private
sector. These methods are: (1) funding some or all of the
project's land costs, and (2) providing a loan or grant to
the project's developer. The authors conclude, however,
that even public sector support will be unable to eliminate
the program's massive deficits.
Funding the Land Cost
When the public sector controls the land on which
development will occur, the city can reduce the developer's
total project costs by reducing the developer's land
acquisition costs. To reduce the developer's land
acquisition costs, the city sells the land to the developer
for some amount less than fair market value. It has been
estimated that the land for the South Harbor site will cost
the developer $10 million. Even if the city took control of
the entire site via its eminent domain powers, and wrote
down the entire $10 million land cost, the program would
still suffer from a huge deficit at build-out, as Table Six
illustrates.
Table Six
Public Sector Land Write Down
Deficit Remaining Deficit Remaining
with with
0% Write Down of 100% Write Down of
Land Costs Land Costs
Hotel $15,225,304 $12,967,304
Office $23,099,229 $18,583,229
Coupling a land "write down" with an increase in the
office rental rate and the hotel room rate, can do more than
a land "write down" alone, but these rates have to rise
substantially to make the difference significant. A
sensitivity analysis was performed, that varied the amount
of the land "write down" with the office and hotel rates, as
a function of each component's deficit at build-out. (See
Office Exhibit 7 and Hotel Exhibit 10). The results of this
analysis indicate that, when the city writes down 100% of
the land cost, the remaining deficit at build-out cannot be
completely eliminated until the office rates reach $22 per
square foot and the hotel rates reach $115 per night. Once
again, the authors caution that such substantial rate
increases, although not unreasonable by national standards,
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are not justified by any current, local market data.
Funding by Loans or Grants
Public sector financing can also be provided in the
form of federal or state loans and grants. The primary
source of federal funding for development projects is the
Urban Development Action Grant Program, (UDAG). Congress
recently approved a 25% funding cut for the UDAG program
for the fiscal year 1986 which will increase the competition
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for UDAG loans. UDAG is required by law not to lend money
to any program which does not have at least $2.5 of private
funding for every $1 of public funding. In reality,
however, loans are rarely made for projects that have less
than a 4:1 ratio of private funds to public funds.
Obviously, the South Harbor program, with a hotel funding
deficit of 47% of total project cost and with an office
funding deficit of 31% of total project cost, is not a
likely candidate for obtaining UDAG funding. However, if
private financing for the South Harbor project could be put
in place, in an amount that represents $4 for every $1 of
requested UDAG money, Lynn would have a chance of receiving
a federal UDAG loan.
The primary source of state funds is the Community
Development Action Grant Program, (CDAG). These funds are
limited, however, and even if the South Harbor project were
to qualify for such a loan, Lynn officials believe that the
loan would not exceed $1 million.
Based on the analysis presented in this section, the
authors conclude that the ACC program, recommended for the
South Harbor site, is not financially feasible and cannot be
made financially feasible by any reasonable combination of
private and public sector financing. If ACC's recommended
program is the result of their analysts' thorough and
accurate assessment of the market, and, represents,
therefore, the best program for the site, the authors would
recommend that the city not proceed with plans to develop
the site. The authors conclude, however, that this program
was derived using inappropriate market data and using a
flawed method for evaluating market data. Therefore, it is
likely that further studies could design a feasible program
for the South Harbor site. The author's conclusion that
the ACC market study is flawed is supported by the
discussion which follows.
Market Feasibility
The following section will critique the ACC marketing
study with an eye towards assessing: (1) the methodology of
the study (2) how much the program was based upon accurate
data and analysis.
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The Methodology of the Study
There are two major limitations of the ACC study: (1)
it assesses the mixed-use development potential of the site
only and (2) it uses a methodological approach that is
incorrect for a mixed-use project. Because of these
constraints, the program for the South Harbor site may
contain inappropriate mix of uses as well as an
inappropriate density for each use.
Study Assesses Mixed-Use Development Potential Only
The ACC study commissioned by the city of Lynn does not
seek to answer what, in general, would be the most
appropriate use for the South Harbor site. The city had
already decided that a first-class mixed-use development was
best for the city. States Planning Director, Kevin Geaney,
"we know what the city needs; we have a better sense about
what is best for the city [than do those not familiar with
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Lynn.]" Marino adds that the site is really a "part of
Boston, the premiere site in Lynn for development." The
site's gateway visibility, he continues, provides Lynn with
an opportunity to create a more positive image for the city,
which is why he and other members of the cabinet are
convinced that the site should be developed as a high
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quality, mixed-use project with a first class hotel.
Thus, their purpose in hiring the American City
Corporation (ACC), a Rouse Company subsidiary, was to have a
nationally reknowned firm assess South Harbor's development
potential in terms of a mixed-use program only. From their
perspective, a positive assessment by this firm could
convince developers that the South Harbor site has good
development potential and attract more developers to vie for
development designation. This decision of city officials to
pursue a mixed-use development program without the benefit
of a highest and best use analysis, however, forecloses
consideration of other potentially viable uses for the site.
The authors feel that by telling ACC to study mixed-use
only, the city received a program they wanted as opposed to
a program which the market could support.
Incorrect Approach for Mixed-Use Project
Market studies for mixed-use projects analyze the
relationships between supply and demand for each use under
consideration, within specified market areas and within
specified time periods, to determine what share of the
market the product can capture. In addition to assessing
the market share that each individual use can capture, good
studies also assess the additional market share that could
be captured due to market synergy that occurs in a mixed-use
develoment. Market synergy takes two forms: (1) on-site
market supports and (2) improved market image and
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penetration.
The ACC study does not analyze market potential by time
period or product type nor does it consider the market
potentials which result from the synergism described above.
Analyzing the market potential by time period and product
type can determine to a large extent the phasing of the
project. Clearly, this analysis in the case of the South
Harbor site could help eliminate conjecture about how to
phase the project. The additional market potential from the
"synergism" of on-site market supports derived from on site
hotel, office, and residential uses are not evaluated in
South Harbor. This is critical for the South Harbor site
because if these factors were considered, a higher density
site may have been identified which would have changed the
program from a multi-use development to a mixed-use
development. Finally, the ability of a mixed-use
development to improve the market image due to creating an
"address" for the site can increase the market penetration,
which also can increase the density of uses that the site
can support. By overlooking the ability of a mixed-use
development to create an "address", the ACC program
forecloses the opportunity to increase the project density
and the ability to successfully charge higher rates.
Therefore, the authors conclude that because the city
imposed limitations that the development potential be
evaluated in terms of mixed-use development only, and
because ACC's approach for analyzing a mixed use project was
flawed, the recommended program was not based upon a
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thorough assessment of the market in Lynn and is an
inappropriate program for the site.
Assessment of Data and Analysis
The recommendations of the ACC study can only be
accurate if correct and reasonable data was used for the
analysis and if the analysis was done correctly. The authors
found some inconsistencies and inaccuracies in both these
areas for all of the uses programmed in the ACC study. The
following discussion critiques : (1) the analysis that
determined the program for the various uses via a case study
of the office segment and (2) the data upon which this
analysis was based.
Analysis that Determined the Program66
For the office portion of the market analysis, the ACC
study stated that the Lynn site could serve a region-wide
office market and in particular, it could serve "back
office" Boston businesses. In order to determine what
market share office use could capture, the study examined
regional and Boston demand data for office space. This
examination assumes that historic demand can be used to
determine future demand and that future supply should equal
this future demand. This analysis ignores two issues: how
the current vacancy rates in Boston and the suburbs will
affect the future absorption of office space, and what
office space is already planned to come on line through the
remainder of the decade in Boston and the suburbs.
In addition, the office use component of the program
recommended by ACC's analysts is the result of a quantum
leap in their analysis: a general discussion of demand for
office space was translated to a specific program that
recommends the development of 700,000 square feet of first-
class office space with rent levels of $20-$30 per square
foot. Detailed analysis done to derive such a program is
omitted. The authors can only conclude that minimal analysis
was presented because only minimal data was collected, and
that the identified program for the office is not free from
imperfection.
Assessment of Data Applied
Even if the data were applied correctly, the analysis
could be incorrect if the data on which it was based were
incorrect. The data applied to the South Harbor is typical
of most marketing studies, where the projected demand is
extrapolated from historical demand. In the case of the
office, the study states that because, historically, the
suburban office captures 40% of new office development in
the region, a demand for 6.5 to 8.7 million square feet can
be expected in the suburbs through the year 1992. It also
states that 10 to 13 million square feet of new office space
will be needed in downtown Boston through the years 1984 and
1987 based upon historical absorption rates.
Recent research in the area of office space demand
contradicts the assumption in the ACC study that historical
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demand can be used to predict future demand. The surge in
office demand in the last decade was a result of the shift
in the economy from manufacturing to services. The
transition to a service economy is almost complete, and
little of the office demand will be from the shift of
manufacturing jobs to nonmanufacturing jobs. The labor
force growth rate is also declining so that only half as
many jobs will be created in this decade as the last, in
order to keep full employment. The fifth-generation
computer technology brings to businesses the ability to
replace people with computers, so that the office space
requirements of businesses will decrease. These factors
will cause absorption rates to decrease substantially.
Developers of office space will face high vacancy rates if
their building plans are based upon historic absorption
rates.
The assumption that two thirds of the current demand
for office space is the result of the expansion of firms as
stated in the ACC study, is very misleading when demand is
being quanitified. Since the 1970s, two thirds of all jobs
were created by firms with less than twenty employees, and
eighty percent were created by firms with less than 100
employees. In fact, the recent surge in growth has been
from small firms which have offset the losses of jobs from
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the large, Fortune 500 firms. This information implies that
the majority of future office demand will be from small
firms that can not initially afford first class office
rents. The ACC's analysts were probably overly optimistic
to assume that tenants in new office space could afford
first class office rents.
In view of the fact that the data used to analyze the
market in Lynn was incorrect and incomplete, that the
analysis was minimal, and that the city "hedged its bet" by
specifying that only mixed-use development be studied, the
program recommended by the ACC study is certainly not a
reflection of what the market can support.
The authors conclude from the feasibility analysis
presented in this chapter, that the ACC program is not
economically feasible. The fact that this program can not
work financially, however, should not preclude South Harbor
from being considered for the development of another
program.
Chapter Four: How the City Should Resolve
the Obstacles to Development
The financial feasibility analysis presented in Chapter
Three illustrates clearly that the city of Lynn will have to
provide some sort of financial assistance to a private
developer, if it wants to see the South Harbor site
developed as a mixed-use project. Chapter One concluded
that the provision of financial assistance alone would not
be enough to ensure that South Harbor is developed
successfully; the city would have to assume an active,
entrepreneurial role in the entire development process.
Chapter Two analyzed the city's involvement in another
public-private partnership and concluded that Lynn officials
do have the ability to act entrepreneurially.
This chapter draws on the authors' evaluations of (1)
the site's constraints, (2) the decision-making and
implementation capabilities of city officials, (3) the
market studies performed for the site and (4) the program's
financial feasibility, to answer two final questions.
First, what issues must the city resolve before the
development of South Harbor can occur? Second, how should
the city proceed to resolve these issues?
Issues the city must resolve
There are five major issues which the city must resolve
if the South Harbor site is to be developed successfully.
These issues relate to site assembly, funding commitments,
program identification, developer selection and role
definition.
Site Assembly
First, the city must resolve how the land designated for
development should be assembled. Basically city officials
have two options for dealing with site assemblage: they can
have the LEDIC exercise its powers of eminent domain and
take the land the city does not already control or they can
act behind the scenes to facilitate a private agreement
between the owners of this land and whomever the LEDIC
designates as developer.
City officials have expressed some hesitation about
taking the land by eminent domain because of their
experience with Riley and America East. However, it is
unlikely that any private developer will pursue land
assembly on his/her own. If the city does not commit to
helping with the site assembly process, few developers will
be willing to spend time and money developing a proposal for
the South Harbor site, since they will have to assume the
risk of site assembly. In addition, 25% of the site is
still owned by Riley's America East company and the eminent
domain proceeding involving the America East parcel will
make it extremely difficult for any private developer to
purchase it. Any developer signing a purchase and sale
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agreement with America East, will undoubtedly be required to
seek the approval of the LEDIC to close on the property,
just as Nebelkopf was required to do in June 1985. As
pointed out previously, the LEDIC did not permit Nebelkopf
to close on the property because it did not feel he had
sufficient financial resources to reimburse the LEDIC for
the $1.6 million the LEDIC owes Massachusetts Electric and
New England Power.
If the city does pursue eminent domain proceedings,
however, the proceedings will take a long time. The action
to take the power companies' land commenced in 1978 and the
damage award was not made until 1985, seven years later. To
the extent that the land acquisition costs for South Harbor
have a significant bearing on the project's feasibility, it
would be difficult for a private developer to formally
commit to a project if he could not be assured of his land
costs up front. Certainly the LEDIC could proceed with
eminent domain proceedings with the intention of writing
down the land costs to the developer, but, in that case, the
LEDIC risks being required to pay the owners an amount far
in excess of what it anticipated: a situation not unlike
that which occurred in the power companies' taking. If the
LEDIC enters an agreement with a developer that requires the
LEDIC to receive any compensation or reimbursement from the
revenues of the future development, the LEDIC risks not
being paid if the project fails.
Commitment to Fund
Another important thing that the city must do is to
commit to fund the project at some level and to determine
what form this financial assistance will take: capital
grant, loan, land write-down or some combination of the
three. It is also possible that Lynn could fund certain
improvements to the site through general obligation bonds,
if taxpayer approval was obtained. In any event, Lynn must
take some action to help fund the project, since the
financial feasibility analysis in chapter three determined
that the project, as programmed, is not financially feasible
at build-out and that the first phase of the project cannot
support the approximately $8 million infrastructure
investment that is required up-front.
As earlier chapters have noted, Lynn officials have
cultivated many political contacts at the state and federal
levels and have been quite successful in obtaining funds for
the city's development projects and have brought in over
$42 million to Lynn since 1977. Seaport Landing, in
particular, received funding from three state agencies,
although, as noted previously, much of this money was
available only because the project was being funded as a
Heritage Park and would not be available for South Harbor.
In addition, state CDAG programs and federal UDAG programs
have both been cut back, and it will be much more difficult
in the future to obtain such funds.
Identify Appropriate Program
Third, a program must be identified that is viable from
both a market and financial perspective; as the previous
chapter makes clear, the program suggested by the ACC study
meets neither of these criteria. The ACC study, at the
order of the city, analyzed the site for a mixed-use program
only; no other potential use for the site was considered.
In addition, the ACC program suffered from flawed
methodology, flawed analysis and flawed data.
Identifying a good program for the site is a task which
the city should not undertake without developer input for,
in the final analysis, the project has to make economic
sense to a developer before he will become involved. City
officials must remember that the ACC study was only a
preliminary assessment of the site's development potential
and that their program was only a first cut at identifying
the right product for the site.
Criteria for Developer Selection
Fourth, city officials must reach a consensus on what
type of developer they are looking for and then set out
specific criteria that a developer will have to meet to win
designation. The developer, at a minimum, should be
required to prove that he has sufficient financial resources
to stay with the project through completion, that he has
assembled a first-rate design and construction team, and
that he has a good track record, particularly with large
scale, mixed-use projects. In addition, given the site
assemblage issues with South Harbor, the developer should be
required to include a strategy for obtaining site control in
his proposal. Certainly this strategy could include having
the LEDIC take the site by eminent domain, but other
strategies, such as having Brettman and Harbor House become
limited partners in the development in return for
contributing their property, may prove workable.
Once the criteria for selection have been made
specific, the LEDIC must stick to these criteria closely,
when making the selection. As noted in Chapter Two, the
LEDIC did not choose Nebelkopf as the developer for Seaport
based on all of the criteria listed in the RFP for that
site. The LEDIC's disregard of its own selection criteria
can be attributed to the fact that only three developers
responded to the RFP and to the fact that two of those
developers joined together at the last minute to present an
incomplete proposal. Nevertheless, by ignoring the
published selection criteria when it made the developer
designation, the LEDIC gave the impression that its decision
was arbitrary, and arguably, helped perpetuate Lynn's image
as a place where officials grant political favors to select
developers. The need to set appropriate criteria and then
to require that the candidates for selection meet these
criteria, is especially critical in the case of South
Harbor, where any development on that site will be more
complicated and larger than the development at Seaport
Landing. In addition, South Harbor will have a much longer
build-out time than will Seaport Landing.
Role Definition
Finally, city officials must clearly define their role
in the project. This definition must go beyond
characterizing their position as an "active" one. Officials
must decide how they will manage the development process
after the developer has been designated, so that the city
gets the first-class, high-quality development that it
wants. For example, in Seaport Landing, development cabinet
members Calnan, Geaney and Kyriakakis, exercised some design
review authority but the scope of their authority was not
clearly defined in any agreement with the developer. Any
decisions they made had to be approved by the city council
to be binding on the developer and although the city council
did approve all of the cabinet's recommendations in the
Seaport Landing case, they were under no obligation to do
so. Because this method of design review did not get the
city all that it wanted in the Seaport Landing development,
it is naive to think that this method would work at South
Harbor, especially since the proposed South Harbor
development is over 10 times the size of Seaport Landing.
Because the proposed South Harbor development is so
much larger and more complicated than any project attempted
by the city to date, it may be appropriate for the city to
set up a "South Harbor Redevelopment Agency" to manage the
project from beginning to end. The development cabinet's
informal method of controlling Seaport Landing may not be
enough to control the development of South Harbor. All
changes and renegotiations between the city and the
developer, that occurred during Seaport Landing's
development, had to be approved by the city council. This
procedure did nothing to insulate the development process
from the political process in Lynn and, in theory, exposed
the developer to the whims of the city council. Also,
because the city's negotiators - the cabinet - did not have
the final authority to agree to a solution, the city's
bargaining position in renegotiations was weaker than it had
to be. A redevelopment agency that was given the authority
to make all decisions with the respect to South Harbor's
development, would concentrate the city's authority in a
formal, less political organization than the city council.
In addition, the establishment of a redevelopment
authority will make it clear to potential developers that
Lynn will be selecting a developer and managing the
development of South Harbor in a thoroughly professional
manner.
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How the city should proceed
This section presents the authors' recommendations for
how Lynn officals should proceed with their efforts to
develop South Harbor. Basically these recommendations
suggest an order which the city should follow in attempting
to resolve the issues presented above.
Establish a South Harbor Redevelopment Agency
The city's first priority should be to establish a
redevelopment agency. As noted above, such an agency should
be given the authority to manage the development of South
Harbor and to represent the city's interests throughout the
life of the project. One of this agency's first tasks
should be to hire consultants to prepare an RFP for the
South Harbor site. Putting out an RFP will help attract
more developer interest than will more informal solicitation
measures and will spark excitement about the site and its
potential for development.
In addition, to establishing development criteria for
the site, the RFP should state explicitly what criteria will
be used to select a developer for the site. These criteria
should require the developer to present proof that he has
sufficient financial resources to stay with the project
through completion, that he has assembled a first-rate
design and construction team, that he has a good track
record with mixed-use projects and that he has come up with
some reasonable strategy for obtaining site control in his
proposal.
Commit to Assembling the Site
The LEDIC should commit to taking the site by eminent
domain unless a developer can come up with a reasonable
strategy for site assembly that does not involve the public
sector. The LEDIC should plan to protect itself against
another Riley and America East problem, by executing with
the developer an agreement that clearly states how the LEDIC
will be reimbursed for the expenses it incurs in taking the
land, how much the LEDIC will be reimbursed for taking the
land and what remedies the LEDIC would have against the
developer if the developer did not meet his reimbursement
obligations. In addition, the LEDIC should require the
developer to be bonded. Basically, bonding the developer
ensures the LEDIC that, whether or not the developer can
meet his obligations to the LEDIC, the LEDIC will get paid
what the developer owes.
Select a Developer
Before proceeding with further market studies or
financial analyses, the redevelopment agency should select a
developer based on the criteria specified in the RFP.
The developer's commitment to the project and to the
city will be enhanced when he plays an integral part in the
process from the very beginning. In addition, involving the
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developer from the start will allow the city to take
advantage of his knowledge and experience during the time
that the final program is being worked out. No one knows
better than the developer, himself, what his resources are
and what type of financial help makes the most sense for
him. Thus, he can help determine the best way for the
city to fulfill its commitment to fund part of the project
and he can work with market analysts to help design the
final site program.
Line up Project Financing
During the developer selection process, the city should
begin its search for project funding. Because the Community
Development Action Grant Program (CDAG) and the Urban
Development Action Grant Program (UDAG) have limited funds
available, the city should work hard to put together a
competitive funding applicaton. As noted in Chapter Three,
UDAG and CDAG monies are rarely distributed to projects that
have less than a 4:1 ratio of private dollars to public
dollars. Thus, the city should take an active role in
helping the developer secure private financing commitments
for the project.
Because IRB's are private funds for purposes of a UDAG
application, the city should attempt to have South Harbor
declared eligible for IRB funding. To do so, the city will
have to make application to the Commonwealth's Executive
Office of Communities and Development to have the site
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designated as a commerical area revitalization, (CAR),
district. As noted previously, this will require that the
site be found to be "open, blighted and decadent."
Finally, city officials should use their political
contacts to scout out other possible sources of state funds,
just as they did for Seaport Landing.
Formalize Relationships
The relationship between the developer and the
redevelopment agency should be formalized in a development
agreement far broader in scope than either the Seaport
Landing or the America East development agreements. Both
agreements imposed no completion schedule on the developer.
They contained no penalty provisions for untimely or
unsatisfactory performance. In addition, they did not set
out specific development responsibilities for either party,
which resulted in the America East parcel laying empty for
seven years. Also the agreements did not address design
review issues, which resulted in city officials not being
wholly satisfied with the final design of Seaport Landing's
condominiums.
Therefore, a comprehensive development agreement that
clarifies design review procedures, private and public
sector responsibilities and performance criteria, benchmarks
for funding and penalities for untimely or unsatisfactory
performance, should be negotiated. The execution of such an
agreement will protect the developer from arbitrary actions
by the city and will give the city the authority necessary
to ensure that the developer performs in an acceptable
manner and to prevent a situation similar to that which
occurred with the America East parcel.
Once the relationship between the developer and the
redevelopment agency is clarified, they can work together to
define an appropriate final product for the South Harbor
site. This will involve the performance of in-depth market
studies to determine what the market will support at South
Harbor and to identify various programs that match these
market projections. It will also involve performing
financial feasibility analyses to determine whether these
programs are economically feasible. Undoubtedly numerous
iterations between market-supported programs and financially
feasible programs will occur before a program that is
feasible from both a market and financial perspective is
identified.
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EXHIBIT A
FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY FOR THE SOUTH HARBOR SITE
ASSUMPTIONS
HOTEL
Financing:
Occupancy:
The loan type is categorized as Debt/Equity Joint
Venture for a Major Project which is 100%
financed by a lender. The term is for 15 years
with a 30 year amortization period, interest at
13% compounded monthly; Payments include
principal and interest, and the lender receives
a 10% - 10.5% cumulative preferred return plus
40% to 60% of cash flow and residuals.
Occupancy in downtown hotels dropped to 69% in
1983 from 70% in 1982, and is expected to
continue to drop. With the increase in the
supply of hotel rooms, 1984 saw occupancy drop
to 64%. Hotels surveyed in the suburban area are
experiencing the following occupancy levels.
HOTEL
Expenses
and
Revenues:
Development
Costs:
OCCUPANCY RATE
Colonial Hilton 60% - 65%
Sheraton Tara 60%
Ramada Inn (E.Boston) 65%
Logan Hilton 69%
In view of this current trend, the occupancy
level chosen for the analysis was a conservative
assumption of 55%.
Basic assumptions in regards to Expenses and
Revenues have been made based upon information
obtained by the 52nd Annual Report on Hotel and
Motor Hotel Operations, conducted by the
consulting arm of the accounting firm of
LAVENTHOL & HORWATH as well as information from
an interview with the THE BEACON COMPANIES, a
developer and operator of hotels.
The Land acquisition cost and the site
infrastructure costs (ie. Seawall repair,
landfill removal, powerline burial) were based
upon various assumptions. Land Acquisition
cost was based upon the recent estimate
submitted by American East Associates in lieu
of a recent appraisal. The cost for powerline
burial, given in 1978 dollars, was an estimate
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given by the New England Power Company to Lynn
City Officials. Landfill removal was
determined by conducting a takeoff of the
volume that was to be filled from "Proposed
Closure Configuration - Solid Waste Area"
submitted to the authors by the Lynn Office of
Economic Development with suggested pricing
for such work given by VAPPI CONSTRUCTION.
VAPPI also gave information used to price pile
construction, condominiums, as well as office
construction.
Apportionment
of Infrastructure
& Land Costs:
Some methodology had to be adopted when
allocating Infrastructure and Land Costs.
Certainly, the Internal Revenue Service would be
objectionable to 100% allocation of these costs
to one use in order for the developer to
maximize his/her financial position. Therefore,
allocation was based upon Floor Area Ratios
(FAR) which basically apportioned by % of square
feet for a use based upon the project's total
square footage.
Capital
Gains: The tax treatment for dispostion of the Hotel or
Office space was treated as capital gains, since
the property was held for investment purposes.
Because the asset has been held for longer than
6 months, the gain is long term and only 40% is
taxed at ordinary income and 60% is excluded
from tax. Assuming that the developer will be in
the 50% tax bracket, the effective tax rate will
be 20%.
Depreciation:
Depreciation is assumed to be 18 year straight
line.
OFFICE
Financing: The financial instrument for the office was a
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Bullet Loan that charges interest only at 14%
with a 15 year call. The loan amount was for
100% of the costs. Also included were estimated
fees for mortgage brokerage, construction loan
brokerage and an origination fee.
Occupancy: Certainly the 700,000 square feet will not
be developed at one time, and occupancy levels
will vary over the development period. So the
assumption of a vacancy rate of 7% was chosen to
represent a "median", since the current
overbuilding could cause this rate to rise to
15%.
Depreciation:
Depreciation is assumed to be 18 year straight
line.
Capital
Gains: Same as Hotel.
RESIDENTIAL
Development
Costs:
Revenues:
Tax
Treatment:
The majority of the assumptions in regards to
construction costs were obtained by VAPPI
CONSTRUCTION and THE BEACON COMPANIES.
The condominium and marina revenues were obtained
by The Codman Company, Inc. Study.
The developer is taxed at the ordinary rates
(50%) on the sale of condominium units.
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HOTEL EXHIBITS
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HOTEL FEASIBILITY
SOUTH HARBOR DEVELOPMENT
LYNN, MASSACHUSETTS
JUNE, 1985
DEFINITIONS:
Revenue
Number of Rooms (NR)
Occupancy Rate (OCC)
Room Rate (RR) **
Beverages (BEV) **
Food (F) **
Telephone (TEL) **
Other Income (01) **
350
55.00%
$65.00
8.20%
18.70%
2.60%
0.40%
** Measured as a percent of Total Revenue
* Measured as a percent of Departmental Revenues
Expenses
Room Payroll & Other (RPO) *
Food Cost (FC) *
Beverage Cost (BC) *
Franchise Fee (FF)**
Telephone (TC) *
Admin. Costs (AC) **
Management Fee (MF) **
Advt. & Business Promo (ABP)
Maintenance (MAIN) **
Energy Costs (EC) **
Insurance (INS) **
Real Estate Taxes (RET)
Capital Reserve (CR) **
Advt.&Bus.Promo Assess.(BP)**
20.00%
90.00%
58.00%
2.80%
95.00%
6.50%
4.00%
3.00%
3.00%
4.00%
4.50%
1.00%
1.40%
FINANCING
Construction Loan (CL)
Interest Rate (ICL)
Permanent Loan (P1)
Interest Rate (IPL)
Amortization (AMORT)
Term (T)
Discount Rate (DR)
Lender's Equity
% of CF & Residuals
10% Cumulative Preferred
DEVELOPMENT COSTS
$27,491,198
13.00%
$27,491,198
13.00%
30
15
50.00%
Development Fee (DF) 3.00%
Const Mgmt. Fee (CMF) 2.00%
Total Gross Sq. Ft. (GBA) 350,000
Structured Pkg. Spaces (SP) 0
Land Acquisition (LA) 10,000,000
Seawall Cost (SC) 2,500,000
Road Cost (RC) 660,000
Landfill Removal (LR) 1,304,696
Piles (PIL) 1,400,000
PowerLine Submersion (PLS) 5,406,333
General Apportion for Infrastructure
(APP) 22.58%
Apportionment of Infrastructure and Land Acquisition
Allocated by Square Feet
Hotel
Office
Residential
22.58%
45.16%
32.26%
EXHIBIT 1
DEVELOPMENT COSTS
COST ITEMS LUMP SIM OF HARD % OF TOTAL X OF COST COST
COST COST F.F. E PER ROOM PER S0. FT.
Land Acquisition $2,258,000
Construction Costs
Road Construction $149,028
Base Building $55,000
Structured Parking so
Construction Mgmt. Fee 2.0001
Seawall $564,500
Powerline Sutmersion $1,220,750
Landfill Removal $294,600
Pite Construction $1,400,000
F.F. & E $10,000
Soft costs
Interior Design $30,000
Design Consultant $100,000
Architectural & Eng. $200,000
Legal $100,000
Other Prof. Services $50,000
Development Fee 3.000%
Franchise Fee $50,000
Testing and Inspection 10.75
Pmts,Lic., & Surveys 1.000%
Advertising & Promo $5,000
Pre-opening
Insurance
Title 0.1002
Btdrs Risk/Liability 0.300%
Reat Est. Taxes $30,000
Interest During Const. 13.000%
(13.00% for 15 months)
Financing Fees 4.000%
Working Capital $1,000
Contingency 5.000%
3====================.. .... = ...== =.  =========...====...==.3
TOTAL $6,446,878 3.300% 25.1002 0.000% $71,000 $0.75
TOTAL NOT
INCLUDING CONST. $6,297,850 1.300% 25.100% 0.0002 $16,000 $0.75
CALCULATE TOT. HARD COSTS $19,794,927
EXHIBIT 2
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE
Construction Start: 1987
ITEM TOTAL COST COST PER
ROOM
Land Acquisition
Construction Costs
Road Const.
Base Building
Struct. Parking
Const. Mgmt. Fee
Seawall
PowerLine submersion
Landfill Removal
Pile Construction
F.F. & E.
Soft Costs
Arch. & Eng.
Interior Design
Design Consult.
Legal
Other Prof. Services
Development Fee
Franchise Fee
Testing and Inspection
Perm.,Lic., & Surveys
Advertising & Promo
Pre-Opening
Insurance
Title
Bldrs. Risk/Liability
Real Estate Taxes
Int. during Const.
Financing
Financing Fees
Working Capital
Contingency
TOTAL
$1,293,703 $3,696
$350,000 $1,000
$1,617,129 $4,620
$32,342,586 $19,367
$2,258,000
$149,028
$19,250,000
$0
$395,899
$564,500
$1,220,750
$294,600
$1,400,000
$3,500,000
$200,000
$30,000
$100,000
$100,000
$50,000
$970,278
$50,000
$262,500
$197,949
$1,750,000
$50,000
$32,343
$59,385
$30,000
$2,102,268
$6,451
$426
$55,000
$0
$1,131
$1,613
$3,488
$842
$4,000
$10,000
$571
$86
$286
$286
$143
$2,772
$143
$750
$566
$5,000
$0
$143
$92
$170
$86
$6,006
EXHIBIT 3
STATEMENT OF PROJECTED INCOME
1987 - 1997
Development Development Operating Operating Stabilized Yr. Operating
YEAR 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Rooms
Available
Occupancy %
Rooms Occupied
Average Rate (inflated 6% annually)
350
55.00%
192.5
$65.00
350
55.00%
192.5
$68.25
350
55.00%
192.5
$71.66
350
55.00%
192.5
$75.25
Revenue
Rooms
Food
Beverage
Telephone
Conference
Other Income
TOTAL REVENUE
Development Expenses
Departmental Expenses
Rooms
Food
Beverage
Telephone
Total Dept. Exp.
General & Unallocated Expen
Admin. & General
Franchise Fee
Advt. & Business Promo
Advt. & Business Prom
Energy
Maintenance
Management Fee
Total Gen't &
Unallocated Exp.
TOTAL EXPENSES
Gross Operating Profit
Less: Taxes & Insurance
Reserves
Plus: Constuction Loan
NET AVAILABLE FOR DEBT
GROSS OPERATING PROFIT
AS A % OF TOTAL
$4,567,063
$1,218,318
$534,236
$169,392
$0
$26,060
0 0 $6,515,068
$9,702,776 $22,639,810
$913,413
$1,096,486
$98,247
$160,922
0 0 $2,269,068
ses
$423,479
$182,422
$195,452
Assess. $91,211
$260,603
$195,452
$260,603
0 0 $1,609,222
$9,702,776 $22,639,810 $3,878,290
($9,702,776) ($22,639,810) $2,636,778
$9,702,776 $22,639,810
$293,178
$65,151
$4,795,416
$1,279,234
$560,947
$177,861
$0
$27,363
$6,840,821
$959,083
$1,151,310
$103,160
$168,968
$2,382,521
$444,653
$191,543
$205,225
$95,771
$273,633
$205,225
$273,633
$1,689,683
$5,035,186
$1,343,195
$588,995
$186,754
$0
$28,731
$7,182,862
$1,007,037
$1,208,876
$108,318
$177,417
$2,501,647
$466,886
$201,120
$215,486
$100,560
$287,314
$215,486
$287,314
$1,774,167
$5,286,946
$1,410,355
$618,444
$196,092
$0
$30,168
$7,542,005
$1,057,389
$1,269,319
$113,733
$186,288
$2,626,730
$490,230
$211,176
$226,260
$105,588
$301,680
$226,260
$301,680
$1,862,875
$4,072,204 $4,275,814 $4,489,605
$2,768,617 $2,907,048 $3,052,400
$307,837
$68,408
$323,229
$71,829
$339,390
$75,420
$0 $2,278,449 $2,392,372 $2,511,991 $2,637,590
34.97% 34.97% 34.97%34 .97%
Operating Operating Operating Operating Operating Operating Sale
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
350
55.00%
192.5
$82.96
$5,828,858
$1,554,916
$681,835
$216,192
$0
$33,260
$8,315,061
$1,165,772
$1,399,425
$125,391
$205,382
$2,895,969
350
55.00%
192.5
$87.11
$6,120,301
$1,632,662
$715,927
$227,001
$0
$34,923
$8,730,814
$1,224,060
$1,469-,396
$131,661
$215,651
$3,040,768
$540,479 $567,503
$232,822 $244,463
$249,452 $261,924
$116,411 $122,231
$332,602 $349,233
$249,452 $261,924
$332,602 $349,233
$2,053,820 $2,156,511
350
55.00%
192.5
$91.46
$6,426,316
$1,714,295
$751,723
$238,351$0
$36,669
$9,167,355
$1,285,263
$1,542,866
$138,244
$226,434
$3,192,806
$595,878
$256,686
$275,021
$128,343
$366,694
$275,021
$366,694
$2,264,337
350
55.00%
192.5
$96.03
$6,747,631
$1,800,010
$789,309
$250,269
$0
$38,503
$9,625,722
$1,349,526
$1,620,009
$145,156
$237,755
$3,352,447
$625,672
$269,520
$288,772
$134,760
$385,029
$288,772
$385,029
$2,377,553
350
55.00%
192.5
$100.84
$7,085,013
$1,890,011
$828,775
$262,782
$0
$40,428
$10,107,008
$1,417,003
$1,701,010
$152,414
$249,643
$3,520,069
$656,956
$282,996
$303,210
$141,498
$404,280
$303,210
$404,280
$2,496,431
350
55.00%
192.5
$105.88
$7,439,264
$1,984,511
$870,213
$275,921$0
$42,449
$10,612,359
$1,487,853
$1,786,060
$160,034
$262,125
$3,696,072
$689,803
$297,146
$318,371
$148,573
$424,494
$318,371
$424,494
$2,621,253
350
55.00%
192.5
$111.17
$7,811,227
$2,083,737
$913,724
$289,717
$0
$44,572
$11,142,977
$1,562,245
$1,875,363
$168,036
$275,232
$3,880,876
$724,293
$312,003
$334,289
$156,002
$445,719
$334,289
$445,719
$2,752,315
$4,714,085 $4,949,789 $5,197,279 $5,457,143 $5,730,000 $6,016,500 $6,317,325 $6,633,191
$3,205,020 $3,365,271 $3,533,535 $3,710,212 $3,895,722 $4,090,508 $4,295,034 $4,509,786
$356,360
$79,191 $374,178$83,151
$392,887
$87,308
$412,531
$91,674
$433,158
$96,257
$454,815
$101,070
$477,556
$106,124
$501,434
$111,430
$2,769,470 $2,907,943 $3,053,340 $3,206,007 $3,366,308 $3,534,623 $3,711,354 $3,896,922
34.97% 34.97% 34.97% 34.97%
350
55.00%
192.5
$79.01
$5,551,293
$1,480,873
$649,367
$205,897
$0
$31,676
$7,919,106
$1,110,259
$1,332,785
$119,420
$195,602
$2,758,066
$514,742
$221,735
$237,573
$110,867
$316,764
$237,573
$316,764
$1,956,019
34.97%. 3 4. 97%/ 34.97%. 34.97%
EXHIBIT 4
ECONOMIC SUMMARY Development Development Operating Operating
1987 1988 1989 1990
Stabilized Yr. Operating
1991 1992
NET AVAILABLE FOR DEBT
Less: Debt service
Cash Flow Before Incentive Fee
Incentive Fee (10% of GOP)
Remaining Cash Flow
Less: Lender Partic.(@50%)
Net Cash Flow to Developer
Plus: Reserves
Less: Depreciation & Amort.
Plus: Amortization on Loan
NET TAXABLE INCOME (LOSS)
AMOUNT OF ITC
$0 $2,278,449 $2,392,372 $2,511,991 $2,637,590
$4,293,282
($2,014,833)
$0
($2,014,833)
$0
($2,014,833)
$65,151
$0 $1,909,370 $7,450,093
$58,381
($9,341,394)
$4,293,282
($1,900,910)
$0
($1,900,910)
$0
($1,900,910)
$68,408
$3,850,093
$65,971
($5,616,624)
$4,293,282
($1,781,292)
$0
($1,781,292)
$0
($1,781,292)
$71,829
$3,850,093
$74,547
($5,485,009)
$4,293,282
($1,655,692)
$0
($1,655,692)
$0
($1,655,692)
$75,420
$2,100,093
$84,238
($3,596,127)
operating
1993
Operating Operating operating Operating Operating Sale
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
$2,769,470 $2,907,943 $3,053,340 $3,206,007 $3,366,308 $3,534,623 $3,711,354 $3,896,922
$4,293,282
($1,523,813)
$0
($1,523,813)
$0
($1,523,813)
$79,191
$2, 100,093
$95,189
$4,293,282
($1,385,339)
$0
($1,385,339)
$0
($1,385,339)
$83,151
$2,100,093
$107,563
$4,293,282
($1,239,942)
$0
($1,239,942)
$0
($1,239,942)
$87,308
$1,394,093
$121,547
$4,293,282
($1,087,275)
$0
($1,087,275)
$0
($1,087,275)
$91,674
$1,394,093
$137,348
$4,293,282
($926,975)
$0
($926,975)
$0
($926,975)
$96,257
$1, 234,723
$155,203
$4,293,282
($758,659)
$0
($758,659)
$0
($758,659)
$101,070
$1,234,723
$175,379
$4,293,282
($581,928)
$0
($581,928)
$0
($581,928)
$106,124
$1,234,723
$198,178
($3,449,526) ($3,294,718) ($2,425,180) ($2,252,347) ($1,910,237) ($1,716,933) ($1,512,349) ($10,162,711)
$4,293,282
($396,361)
$0
($396,361)
$0
($396,361)
$111,430
$9,877,780
$0
EXHIBIT 5 Development Development Operating Operating Stabilized Yr. Operating
DEPRECIATION ANALYSIS 1967 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
18 Year Real Property/ITC
Elevators $1111,111 1111 11,111 $11,111
ProRata Share of Soft Cost $833 $833 5833 $833
TOTAL 18 YR. ITC $0 $0 $111,944 $11,944 $11,944 $11,944
18 YEAR PROPERTY
Other- Consruction $1,099,718 $1,099,718 $1,099,718 $1,099,718
Design Services $16,667 $16,667 $16,667 $16,667
Prof. & Development Serv $2,771 12,778 $2,778 12,778
Permits & Surveys $10,997 $10,997 110,997 $10,997
Insurance $2,778 $2,778 $2,778 $2,778
Develop. Contingency $89,841 $89,841 $89,841 $89,841
TOTAL 18 YEAR 50 10 $1,222,778 $1,222,778 S1,222,778 $1,222,778
5 yr ACRS/ITC
FFLE
Design Service
TOTAL 5 YR ITC
OTHER AMORTIZED COSTS
Marketing/Pre-Opening(5yr)
R.E. Tax & Interest (10yr)
Financing Fee (10yr)
TOTAL AMORTIZED
EXPENSED
Sates Tax
Inventory
TOTAL EXPENSED
NOT DEPRECIABLE
Land
Operating Reserve
TOTAL NOT DEPREC.
TOTAL PROJECT COST
TOTAL ITC
$700,000 $700,000 $700,000 $700,000
$6,000 $6,000 $6,000 $6,000
50 50 $706,000 $706,000 $706,000 $706,000
11,750,000 $1,750,000 $1,750,000 $1,750,000 $1,750,000$30,000 $30,000 $30,000 530,000 $30,000 $30,000$129,370 $129,370 $129,370 $129,370 $129,370 $129,370
11.909,370 $1,909,370 $1,909,370 $1,909,370 $1,909,370 $159,370
$1,750,000
$1,750,000
$3,500,000
S2,258,000
$350,000
50 S0 S0 10 50
51,909,370 $7,450,093 $3,850,093 53,850,093 $2,100,093
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EXHIBIT 6
LOAN AMORITIZATION SCHEDULE
Development Development
1987 1988
1
$17,117,283 $17,058,901 $16,992,931 $16,918,384 $16,834,146 $16,738,957 $16,631,394
$58,381 $65,971 $74,547 $84,238 $95,189 $107,563
$4,234,901 $4,227,312 $4,218,736 $4,209,045 $4,198,094 $4,185,719
LOAN BALANCE
AMORTIZATION
INTEREST
Operation
1989
2
Operation
1990
3
Stabilized Yr
1991
4
Operation
1992
5
Operation
1993
6
Operation
1994
7
Operation
1995
8
Operation
1996
9
Operation
1997
10
Operation
1998
11
Sale
1999
12
Loan
Balance
$16,509,848 $16,372,500 $16,217,297 $16,041,918 $15,843,739 $15,619,798
$121,547 $137,348 $155,203 $175,379 $198,178
$4,171,736 $4,155,935 $4,138,080 $4,117,903 $4,095,104
SENSITIVITY
FEASIBILITY INDICATORS USING INDUSTRIAL REVENUE BONDS (10%)
Room Rate =$110.00
STABILIZED YEAR CAPPED AT 15%
IN ORDER TO DETERMINE BUILDING COST
DEBT COVERAGE RATIO IN STABILIZED YEAR
CASH ON COST RETURN IN STABILIZED YEAR
$19,380,320
58.51%
8.99%
Expected
$32,342,586
110% - 125%
15%
EXHIBIT 8
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY INDICATORS VARYING ROOM RATE WITH IRB FINANCING
$55.00
$60.00
$65.00
$70.00
$75.00
$80.00
$85.00
Room Rate $90.00
$95.00
$100.00
$105.00
$110.00
$115.00
$120.00
$125.00
$130.00
80.00%
85.00%
90.00%
95.00%
100.00%
Stabilized Yr. Debt
Capped at 15% R
+$SYC +$DCR
16,398,732
17,889,526
19,380,320
20,871,114
22,361,908
23,852,701
25,343,495
26,834,289
28,325,083
29,815,877
31,306,671
32,797,465
34,288,258
35,779,052
37,269,846
38,760,640
19,380,320
19,380,320
19,380,320
19,380,320
19,380,320
Coverage Cash on Cost
atio Return
+$COC
62.41%
68.08%
73.75%
79.43%
85.10%
90.77%
96.45%
102.12%
107.79%
113.47%
119.14%
124.81%
130.49%
136.16%
141.83%
147.51%
43.24%
42.28%
41.36%
40.48%
39.64%
7.61%
8.30%
8.99%
9.68%
10.37%
11.06%
11.75%
12.45%
13.14%
13.83%
14.52%
15.21%
15.90%
16.59%
17.29%
17.98%
6.64%
6.49%
6.35%
6.22%
6.09%
STABILIZED YEAR CAPITALIZED AT 15% AS A FUNCTION OF ROOM RATE
Stabilized Yr. Capitalized
+SYC
$55.00 16,398,732
$60.00 17,889,526
$55.00 16,398,732
$65.00 19,380,320
$75.00 22,361,908
$85.00 25,343,495
Roam Rate $95.00 28,325,083
$105.00 31,306,671
$115.00 34,288,258
$125.00 37,269,846
$135.00 40,251,434
$145.00 43,233,021
$155.00 46,214,609
DEBT COVERAGE RATIO AS A FUNCTION OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND ROOM RATE
+$DCR
$55.00
$65.00
$75.00
$85.00
$95.00
Room Rate $105.00
$115.00
$125.00
$135.00
$145.00
$155.00
0.00%
57.49%
67.95%
78.40%
88.85%
99.31%
109.76%
120.21%
130.67%
141.12%
151.57%
162.03%
10.00%
53.66%
63.42%
73.17%
82.93%
92.69%
102.44%
112.20%
121.96%
131.71%
141.47%
151.22%
20.00%
50.31%
59.45%
68.60%
77.75%
86.89%
96.04%
105.19%
114.33%
123.48%
132.63%
141.77%
% of Infrastructure
30.00% 40.00%
47.35% 44.72%
55.96% 52.85%
64.56% 60.98%
73.17% 69.11%
81.78% 77.24%
90.39% 85.37%
99.00% 93.50%
107.61% 101.63%
116.22% 109.76%
124.82% 117.89%
133.43% 126.02%
50.00%
42.36%
50.07%
57.77%
65.47%
73.17%
80.88%
88.58%
96.28%
103.98%
111.69%
119.39%
60.00%
40.25%
47.56%
54.88%
62.20%
69.51%
76.83%
84.15%
91.47%
98.78%
106.10%
113.42%
70.00%
38.33%
45.30%
52.27%
59.24%
66.20%
73.17%
80.14%
87.11%
94.08%
101.05%
108.02%
80.00%
36.59%
43.24%
49.89%
56.54%
63.20%
69.85%
76.50%
83.15%
89.80%
96.46%
103.11%
90.00%
35.00%
41.36%
47.72%
54.08%
60.45%
66.81%
73. 17%
79.54%
85.90%
92.26%
98.62%
100.00%
33.54%
39.64%
45.73%
51.83%
57.93%
64.03%
70.12%
76.22%
82.32%
88.42%
94.52%
COST ON COST RETURN AS A FUNCTION OF INFRASTRUTURE COSTS AND ROOM RATE
+$COC
$55.00
$65.00
$75.00
$85.00
$95.00
Room Rate $105.00
$115.00
$125.00
$135.00
$145.00
$155.00
0.00%
8.83%
10.44%
12.04%
13.65%
15.26%
16.86%
18.47%
20.07%
21.68%
- 23.28%
24.89%
10.00%
8.24%
9.74%
11.24%
12.74%
14.24%
15.74%
17.24%
18.73%
20.23%
21.73%
23.23%
20.00%
7.73%
9.13%
10.54%
11.94%
13.35%
14.75%
16.16%
17.56%
18.97%
20.37%
21.78%
% of Infrastructure
30.00% 40.00%
7.27% 6.87%
8.60% 8.12%
9.92% 9.37%
11.24% 10.62%
12.56% 11.87%
13.89% 13.11%
15.21% 14.36%
16.53% 15.61%
17.85% 16.86%
19.18% 18.11%
20.50% 19.36%
Costs
50.00%
6.51%
7.69%
8.87%
10.06%
11.24%
12.42%
13.61%
14.79%
15.97%
17.16%
18.34%
%Zs, 4
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EXHIBIT 9
SYNDICATION SIMULATION
Debt Coverage Ratio
Maximum Debt Service
Equity Required
Loan Amount
Room Rate = $65.00
110.00%
$2,283,628
$15,225,304
$17,117,283
NET AVAILABLE FOR DEBT
Less: Debt service
Cash Flow Before Incentive Fee
Preferred Return to Lender (10% of GOP
Remaining Cash Flow
Less: Lender Partic.(@50%)
Net Cash Flow to Developer
Plus: Reserves
Less: Depreciation & Amort.
Plus: Amortization on Loan
NET TAXABLE INCOME (LOSS)
$0 $0 $2,278,449
$2,283,628
($2,014,833)
$0
($2,014,833)
$0
($2,014,833)
$65,151
$0 $1,909,370 $7,450,093
$58,381
($9,341,394)
GENERAL PARTNER RETURN
NET TAXABLE INCOME (LOSS)
TAX SAVINGS
RESIDUALS TAX
TOTAL BENEFITS
IRR 1.31%
Partnership
(PART)
($17,417,747)
$0
$4,670,697
$0 $0
$2,808,312 $2,742,505
$4,670,697 $2,808,312 $2,742,505 $1,798,064
100.00%
$2,392,372
$2,283,628
($1,900,910)
$0
($1,900,910)
$0
($1,900,910)
$68,408
$3,850,093
$65,971
($5,616,624)
$2,511,991
$2,283,628
($1,781,292)
$0
($1,781,292)
$0
($1,781,292)
$71,829
$3,850,093
$74,547
($5,485,009)
$2,637,590
$2,283,628
($1,655,692)
$0
($1,655,692)
$0
($1,655,692)
$75,420
$2,100,093
$84,238
($3,596,127)
$0
$1,798,064
$2,769,470 $2,907,943 $3,053,340 $3,206,007 $3,366,308 $3,534,623 $3,711,354
$2,283,628 $2,283,628 $2,283,628 $2,283,628 $2,283,628 $2,283,628 $2,283,628
($1,523,813) ($1,385,339) ($1,239,942) ($1,087,275) ($926,975) ($758,659) ($581,928)
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
($1,523,813) ($1,385,339) ($1,239,942) ($1,087,275) ($926,975) ($758,659) ($581,928)
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
($1,523,813) ($1,385,339) ($1,239,942) ($1,087,275) ($926,975) ($758,659) ($581,928)
$79,191 $83,151 $87,308 $91,674 $96,257 $101,070 $106,124
$2,100,093 $2,100,093 $1,394,093 $1,394,093 $1,234,723 $1,234,723 $1,234,723
$95,189 $107,563 $121,547 $137,348 $155,203 $175,379 $198,178
($3,449,526) ($3,294,718) ($2,425,180) ($2,252,347) ($1,910,237) ($1,716,933) ($1,512,349)
U,
Residual
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $130,261
$1,724,763 $1,647,359 $1,212,590 $1,126,173 $955,119 $858,466 $756,174
($1,936,434)
$1,724,763 $1,647,359 $1,212,590 $1,126,173 $955,119 $858,466 ($1,049,998)
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN FOR LIMITED PARTNERS AS A FUNCTION OF ROOM RATE
+$SYN $55.00 $65.00 $75.00 $85.00 $95.00
0.00% ERR ERR ERR ERR ERR
10.00% -29.17% -34.19% ERR ERR ERR
20.00% -22.30% -25.40% ERR ERR ERR
% of 30.00% -17.62% -19.86% ERR ERR ERR
Project 40.00% -13.91% -15.58% -22.25% ERR ERR
Allocated 50.00% -10.75% -11.98% -15.26% ERR ERR
to 60.00% -7.97% -8.83% -10.83% ERR ERR
Limited 70.00% -5.44% -6.00% -7.17% -10.01% ERR
Partners 80.00% -3.11% -3.39% -3.95% -4.40% -1.58%
90.00% -0.94% -0.97% -1.03% -0.36% 3.97%
100.00% 1.11% 1.31% 1.67% 3.09% 8.23%
$105.00
ERR
ERR
ERR
ERR
ERR
ERR
ERR
6.54%
12.53%
17.54%
22.02%
$115.00
ERR
ERR
ERR
ERR
15.05%
24.75%
33.00%
40.44%
47.31%
53.76%
59.87%
$125.00
ERR
-17.03%
-15.91%
-15.48%
-15.24%
-15.10%
-15.00%
-14.93%
-14.87%
-14.83%
-14.79%
$135.00
ERR
-22.47%
-20.08%
-18.94%
-18.25%
-17.78%
-17.45%
-17.19%
-16.99%
-16.83%
-16.69%
EQUITY REQUIRED AS A FUNCTION OF LAND COSTS AND ROOM RATE
+$ER $55.00 $65.00 $75.00 $85.00 $95.00
$0 $15,600,732 $12,967,304 $10,333,876 $7,700,448 $5,067,020
$1,000,000 $15,826,532 $13,193,104 $10,559,676 $7,926,248 $5,292,820
$2,000,000 $16,052,332 $13,418,904 $10,785,476 $8,152,048 $5,518,620
$3,000,000 $16,278,132 $13,644,704 $11,011,276 $8,377,848 $5,744,420
$4,000,000 $16,503,932 $13,870,504 $11,237,076 $8,603,648 $5,970,220
Land $5,000,000 $16,729,732 $14,096,304 $11,462,876 $8,829,448 $6,196,020
Acquisition $6,000,000 $16,955,532 $14,322,104 $11,688,676 $9,055,248 $6,421,820
$7,000,000 $17,181,332 $14,547,904 $11,914,476 $9,281,048 $6,647,620
$8,000,000 $17,407,132 $14,77,704 $12,140,276 $9,506,848 $6,873,420
$9,000,000 $17,632,932 $14,999,504 $12,366,076 $9,732,648 $7,099,220
$10,000,000 $17,858,732 $15,225,304 $12,591,876 $9,958,448 $7,325,020
$125.00
($2,833,265)
($2,607,465)
($2,381,665)
($2,155,865)
($1,930,065)
($1,704,265)
($1,478,465)
($1,252,665)
($1,026,865)
($801,065)
($575,265)
$135.00
($5,466,693)
($5,240,893)
($5,015,093)
($4,789,293)
($4,563,493)
($4,337,6931
($4,111,893)
($3,886,093)
($3,660,293)
($3,434,493)
($3,208,693)
$105.00
$2,433,591
$2,659,391
$2,885,191
$3,110,991
$3,336,791
$3,562,591
$3,788,391
$4,014,191
$4,239,991
$4,465,791
$4,691,591
$115.00
($199,837)
$25,963
$251,763
$477,563
$703,363
$929,163
$1,154,963
$1,380,763
$1,606,563
$1,832,363
$2,058,163
OFFICE EXHIBITS
130
THE LYNN SOUTH HARBOR OFFICE BUILDINGS PRO-FORMA DEVELOPMENT COSTS
BASIS FOR PROJECTION
REVENUES
Market Bldg. Rent (MBR)
Growth Factors
Market Rents (IMR)
Operating (IOE)
STABILIZED YEAR
$18.00
6.0%
6.0%
LEASING
Lease Term (LT)
Lease Commission (LC)
HOLDING PERIOD (HP)
Ordinary Income (OIT)
Capital Gains (CGT)
Depreciable Base (DB)
SALE
Stabilized Cap Rate (SCR)
Disposition Cap Rate(DCR)
Sales Expense (SE)
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT (ITC)
NET RENTABLE AREA (NRA)
VACANCY RATE (VR)
Before Tax (BTHR)
10.0%
10.0%
3.0%
20.0%
700,000 sq.ft.
7.0%
20.0%
CAPITAL
Equity Invest. (EQ) $0
Construct. Loan (CL) $74,428,756
Permanent Loan (PL) $74,428,756
% Funded by tender(PF) 100.0%
FINANCING
Constr. Mtg. Rate(CMR) 14.0%
Perm. Mtg. Rate (PMR) 14.0%
interest only
OPERATING EXPENSES (OE)
(inc. real estate taxes)
$6.00 per sq.ft.
TAXATION
1989
50.0%
5 yrs.
20.0%
20.0%
15 yrs.
10 yrs.
HURDLE RATE
CONSTRUCTION COSTS
Land Acquisition (LA) $10,000,000
Base Building psf (BB) $70.00
Const. Inflation (C) 6.00%
Piling Cost psf (PIL) 3,200,000
Tenant Fit-Up psf (TFU) $12.00
Landfill Removal pcy(LR) 1,304,696
Road Const. pLf (RC) $660,000
Premium for Construction
over 10 stories psf(PCC) $2.00
Structured Parking (GAR) $32.00
Power Line Sub. (PLC) $5,406,333
Seawall Cost (SC) $2,500,000
Apport. of Costs (APP) 45.16%
Apportionment of Infrastructure
Land Acquisition Allocated by Square Feet
Office 45.16%
Hotel 22.58%
Residential 32.26%
EXHIBIT 1: PROJECT COST ESTIMATE, ITC, DEPRECIATION
ACOUISITION/DEVELOPMENT COST YEARS ITC ITEMS DEPRECIATION
5 YEAR 10 YEAR 18 YEAR
ACQUISITION
Purchase Price
Land 54,516,000
Legal, Title,Closing 5100,000 18 $5,556
Origination Fee 555,000 10 55,500
54,671,000
CONSTRUCTION
Base Building $51,940,000
Other Const./ Tenant Opts. $8,400,000
Arch. & Engineering S200,000
Piles S3,200,000
Landfill Removal S589,201
Road Construction S298,056
Parking
Power lines $2,441,500
Seawall Cost $1,129,000
68,197,756 18 S3.788,764
DEVELOPMENT
Leasing & Marketing S500,000 5 $100,000
Real Estate Taxes & Ins. 150,000 10 $5,OO
Development Fee S250,000 S250,000
800,000
FINANCIAL
Constr. Period Int.
(IF x CJR x .5) S5,210,013 10 5521,001
Perm. Mtg. Brokerage Fee $110,000 10 511,000
Constr. Loan Srkrg. Fee 550,000 1
55,370,013
CONTINGENCY RESERVES
Constr. & Tenant imprvmts. 5100,000
Rent-Up Deficit $300,000 1
General Contingency %200,000
$600,000
TOTAL EST. PROJECT COST (PC) S74,428,756 5114
Less:
DEPRECIABLE BASIS 15 s0
$100,000 $542,501 $3,794,320
AMORTIZATION YRS. 1-5 (DEP)
EXHIBIT 2: NET OPERATING INCOME & PROCEEDS FROM SALE
YEAR 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ACTIVITY Construction Leasing Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations
MARKET RENTS @ (IMR) $20.22 $21.44 $22.72 $24.09 $25.53 $27.07 $28.69 $30.41
GROSS REVENUES
LESS:
Rent-Up Deficit
Vacancy
Landlord Expenses @ J0E
Leasing Commission @ LC
Oper. Expenses @ (IOE) psf
Total Oper. Expenses
$12,600,000 $12,600,000 $12,600,000 $12,600,000 $12,600,000 $20,082,486 $20,082,486
($300,000)
($882,000) ($882,000) ($882,000) ($882,000)($1,405,774)($1,405,774)
($37,000) ($39,220) ($41,573) ($44,068) ($46,712) ($49,514) ($52,485)
(2,343,600) ($3,735,342)
($6.00) ($6.36) ($6.74) ($7.15) ($7.57) ($8.03) ($8.51)
($4,200,000)($4,200,000)($4,200,000)($4,200,000)($4,200,000)($5,620,547)($5,620,547)
NET OPERATING INCOME (NOI) $0 $8,063,000 $7,478,780 $7,476,427 $7,473,932 $7,471,288 $9,271,308 $13,003,679
SALES PRICE @ (DCR)
SALES EXPENSE
SALES PROCEEDS (SP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
8 9 10 11 12
Operations Operations Operations Operations Sale
$32.24 $34.17 $36.22 $38.39 $40.70
$20,082,486 $20,082,486 $20,082,486 $26,874,896 $26,874,896
($1,405,774)($1,405,774)
($55,634) ($58,972)
($9.02) ($9.56)
($5,620,547)($5,620,547)
($1,405,774)($1,881,243)($1,881,243)
($62,511) ($66,261) ($70,237)
($10.14) ($10.75) ($11.39)
($5,620,547)($7,521,560)($7,521,560)
$13,000,530 $12,997,192 $12,993,654 $17,405,832 $17,401,856
174,058,317 ************
($5,221,749)($5,220,557)
168,836,567 168,798,003
EXHIBIT 3: BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW
YEAR 1987 1988 1989 1990 * 1991 1992 1993 1994
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ACTIVITY Construction Leasing Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations
TOTAL PROJECT COST (PC) ($74,428,756)
NET OPERATING INCOME (NOI) $0 $8,063,000 $7,478,780 $7,476,427 $7,473,932 $7,471,288 $9,271,308 $13,003,679
FINANCE
Construction Loan (CL) $74,428,756
Perm. Debt Service ($10,420,026)(10,420,026)(10,420,026)(10,420,026)(10,420,026)(10,420,026)(10,420,026)
(nt. only & PMR)
SALES PROCEEDS
REPAYMENT OF DEBT
BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW
($0) $0 ($2,357, 026)($2,941,246)($2,943,599)($2,946,094)($2,948,738)($1,148,718) $2,583,653
W/OUT PREFERRED RETURN
NET PRESENT VALUE @ BTHR $6,099,319
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN 32.62%
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
8 9 10 11 12
Operations Operations Operations Operation Sale
$13,000,530 $12,997,192 $12,993,654 $17,405,832 $17,401,856
(10,420,026)(10,420,026) (10,420,026)(10,420,026)
$168,836,567
($74,428,756)
$2,580,504 $2,577,166 $96,981,438
EXHIBIT 4: AFTER TAX CASH FLOW
YEAR 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ACTIVITY Construction Leasing Operations operations Operations Operations Operations Operations
BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW
($0) $0 ($2,357,026)($2,941,246)($2,943,599)($2,946,094)($2,948,738)($1,148,718) $2,583,653
LESS:
CONSTR. PERIOD DEDUCTIONS
Building ($0)
Closing Costs ($5,556)
Origination Fee ($5,500)
Real Estate Taxes & Ins. ($5,000)
Construction Interest ($521,001)
Equity Placement Fee ($0)
Constr. Loan Brkrg. Fee ($50,000)
DEPRECIATION/AMORTIZATION
5 Year ($100,000) ($100,000) ($100,000) ($100,000) ($100,000)
10 Year ($542,501) ($542,501) ($542,501) ($542,501) ($542,501) ($542,501) ($542,501)
18 Year ($3,794,320)($3,794,320)($3,794,320)($3,794,320)($3,794,320)($3,794,320)($3,794,320)
TAXABLE INCOME (LOSS) ($587,057) ($6,793,847) (7,378,067) (7,380,420) (7,382,915) (7,385,559) (5,485,539) (1,753,168)
TAX LIABILITY @ OIT $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
TAX SHELTER @OIT $293,528 $3,396,924 $3,689,034 $3,690,210 $3,691,457 $3,692,779 $2,742,770 $876,584
I-i CAPITAL GAINS
Sales Proceeds
00 Less Book Value:
Original Basis
Depreciation Taken
Taxable Gain
CAPITAL GAINS TAX @ CGT
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT $0
AFTER TAX CASH FLOW
$0 $293,528 $1,039,898 $747,788 $746,611 $745,364 $744,042 $1,594,051 $3,460,237
W/OUT INVESTOR SPLIT
NET PRESENT VALUE @ ATHR $84,753,348
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN -287.3%
WITH INVESTOR SPLIT
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
8 9 10 11
Operations Operations Operations Sale
$2,580,504 $2,577,166
($542,501) ($542,501)
($3,794,320)($3,794,320)
(1,756,317) (1,759,655)
$0
$878,159
$96,981,438 $6,985,806 $17,401,856
($526,001) ($526,001)
($3,794,320)($3,794,320)
92,661,117 2,665,485
$0 ($46,330,559)($1,332,742)
$879,828 $0 $0
$168,836,567
$67,997,756
(41,737,518)
$26,260,239
$142,576,328
($28,515,266)
$3,458,663 $3,456,994 $68,466,173
EXHIBIT 5
FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY INDICATORS
INTER.RATE OF RET. (ATIRR)
DEBT COVERAGE RATIO (DC)
STABILIZED YEAR CAPITALIZED
AT 12% (SYC)
27.94%
77.38%
67,191,667
EXHIBIT 6
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
DEBT COVERAGE RATIO AS A FUNCTION OF RENTAL RATE AND % INFRASTRUCTURE
% of Infrastructure
+$DC 0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00%
$20.00 103.27% 100.22% 97.36% 94.65% 92.08% 89.66% 87.35%
$22.00 118.54% 115.05% 111.76% 108.65% 105.71% 102.92% 100.28%
$24.00 133.82% 129.88% 126.16% 122.65% 119.33% 116.19% 113.20%
$26.00 149.10% 144.71% 140.56% 136.65% 132.95% 129.45% 126.13%
$28.00 164.38% 159.53% 154.97% 150.66% 146.58% 142.71% 139.05%
Rental Rate $30.00 179.65% 174.36% 169.37% 164.66% 160.20% 155.98% 151.97%
$32.00 194.93% 189.19% 183.77% 178.66% 173.82% 169.24% 164.90%
$34.00 210.21% 204.02% 198.18% 192.66% 187.45% 182.51% 177.82%
$36.00 225.49% 218.84% 212.58% 206.67% 201.07% 195.77% 190.74%
$38.00 240.77% 233.67% 226.98% 220.67% 214.69% 209.04% 203.67%
$40.00 256.04% 248.50% 241.39% 234.67% 228.32% 222.30% 216.59%
70.00%
85.17%
97.77%
110.37%
122.97%
135.57%
148.17%
160.77%
173.37%
185.97%
198.57%
211. 17%
80.00%
83.09%
95.38%
107.67%
119.96%
132.26%
144.55%
156.84%
169.13%
181.43%
193.72%
206.01%
90.00%
81.11%
93.11%
105.10%
117.10%
129.10%
141.10%
153.10%
165.10%
177.10%
189.10%
201.10%
100.00%
79.22%
90.94%
102.66%
114.38%
126.10%
137.82%
149.54%
161.26%
172.98%
184.69%
196.41%
+$SYC
Market
Building Rent
$20.00
$22.00
$24.00
$26.00
$28.00
$30.00
$32.00
$34.00
$36.00
STABILZED YEAR CAPITALIZED AT'12% AS A FUNCTION OF RENTAL RATE AND INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS
% of Infrastructure Costs
0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00%
78,858,333
90,525,000
102,191,667
113,858,333
125,525,000
137,191,667
148,858,333
160,525,000
172,191,667
78,858,333
90,525,000
102,191,667
113,858,333
125,525,000
137,191,667
148,858,333
160,525,000
172,191,667
78,858,333
90,525,000
102,191,667
113,858,333
125,525,000
137,191,667
148,858,333
160,525,000
172,191,667
78,858,333
90,525,000
102,191,667
113,858,333
125,525,000
137,191,667
148,858,333
160,525,000
172,191,667
78,858,333
90,525,000
102,191,667
113,858,333
125,525,000
137,191,667
148,858,333
160,525,000
172,191,667
78,858,333
90,525,000
102,191,667
113,858,333
125,525,000
137,191,667
148,858,333
160,525,000
172,191,667
78,858,333
90,525,000
102,191,667
113,858,333
125,525,000
137,191,667
148,858,333
160,525,000
172,191,667
$38.00 183,858,333 183,858,333 183,858,333 183,858,333 183,858,333 183,858,333 183,858,333
70.00% 80.00%
78,858,333 78,858,333
90,525,000 90,525,000
102,191,667 102,191,667
113,858,333 113,858,333
125,525,000 125,525,000
137,191,667 137,191,667
148,858,333 148,858,333
160,525,000 160,525,000
172,191,667 172,191,667
183,858,333 183,858,333
90.00% 100.00%
78,858,333 78,858,333
90,525,000 90,525,000
102,191,667 102,191,667
113,858,333 113,858,333
125,525,000 125,525,000
137,191,667 137,191,667
148,858,333 148,858,333
160,525,000 160,525,000
172,191,667 172,191,667
183,858,333 183,858,333
EXHIBIT 7
LAND WRITE DOWN SIMULATION
EQUITY REQUIRED AS A FUNCTION OF LAND COSTS AND R64T RATE
+$ER $18.00 $19.00 $20.00 $21.00 $22.00 $23.00 $24.00 $25.00 $26.00
$0 $18,583,229 $14,126,988 $9,670,747 $5,214,506 $758,265 ($3,697,975)($8,154,216)************************
$1,000,000 $19,034,829 $14,578,588 $10,122,347 $5,666,106 $1,209,865 ($3,246,375)($7,702,616)************************
$2,000,000 $19,486,429 $15,030,188 $10,573,947 $6,117,706 $1,661,465 ($2,794,775)($7,251,016)************************
$3,000,000 $19,938,029 $15,481,788 $11,025,547 $6,569,306 $2,113,065 ($2,343,175)($6,799,416)************************
$4,000,000 $20,389,629 $15,933,388 $11,477,147 $7,020,906 $2,564,665 ($1,891,575)($6,347,816)************************
Land $5,000,000 $20,841,229 $16,384,988 $11,928,747 $7,472,506 $3,016,265 ($1,439,975)($5,896,216)************************
Acquisition $6,000,000 $21,292,829 $16,836,588 $12,380,347 $7,924,106 $3,467,865 ($988,375)($5,444,616)($9,900,857)************
$7,000,000 $21,744,429 $17,288,188 $12,831,947 $8,375,706 $3,919,465 ($536,775)($4,993,016)($9,449,257)************
$8,000,000 $22,196,029 $17,739,788 $13,283,547 $8,827,306 $4,371,065 ($85,175)($4,541,416)($8,997,657)************
$9,000,000 $22,647,629 $18,191,388 $13,735,147 $9,278,906 $4,822,665 $366,425 ($4,089,816)($8,546,057)************
$10,000,000 $23,099,229 $18,642,988 $14,186,747 $9,730,506 $5,274,265 $818,025 ($3,638,216)($8,094,457)************
U-'
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RESIDENTIAL CONDOMINIUM FEASIBILITY
SOUTH HARBOR SITE
JUNE 1985
DEFINITIONS:
Revenue:
Condo Sale Price/sf (PSF)
Marine Slip price (MSP)
Gross square feet
of condo area (GSF)
Number of Slips (NS)
Number of Condo Units (TU)*
* assume 1000 gsf/unit
$150
$30,000
500,000
300
500
Apportionment of Infrastructure and
Land Acquisition, allocated by Square Feet
Hotel 22.58%
Office 45.16%
Residential 32.26%
Development Costs
Total Site Development Costs
(SDC)
Apportionment to Site Dev. Costs
(APP)
Base Building Cost
per sq. ft. (HCC)
Land Acquisition (LA)
SeawalL Repair (SC)
Powerline Sub. (PS)
Landfill Removal (LR)
Road Construction (RC)
Pile Construction (PC)
per sq. ft.
Tot. Infrastructure Costs (TIC)
of Project
$10,571,029
$61
$10,000,000
$2,500,000
$5,406,333
$1,304,696
$600,000
$4
$9,811,029
EXHIBIT 1
DEVELOPMENT COSTS
TOTAL AMOUNT COST
PROJECT ALLOCATED PER
COST TO CONDOS UNIT
ENTIRE PROJECT COSTS
Land Acquisition
Land Purchase Price
Legal & Accounting
TOTAL ACQUISITION
Site Development
Seawall
PowerLine burial
Landfill removal
Road Const.
TOTAL SITE DEV. (SDC)
CONDO SPECIFIC COSTS
Soft Development Costs
Arch. & Eng.
Marketing
Legal
TOTAL SOFT COSTS
Construction
Basic Unit
@ $61/gsf
Pile Construction
TOTAL CONSTRUCTION
$10, 000, 000
$100,000
$10,100,000
$2,500,000
$5,406,333
$1,304,696
$600,000
$9,811,029
$3,226,000
$32,260
$3,258,260
$806,500
$1,744,083
$420,895
$193,560
$3,165,038
$500,000
$200,000
$100,000
$800,000
$6,452
$65
$6,517
$1,613
$3,488
$842
$387
$6,330
$1,000
$400
$200
$1,600
$30,500,000 $61,000
$2,000,000 $4,000
$32,500,000 $65,000
Financing
Fees
Construction loan (nt.)
TOTAL FINANCING
Amenities
outdoor pool
Tennis courts
Health club
Marina 220k/slip
TOTAL AMENITIES
TOTAL OVERHEAD (2%)
TOTAL COST
EXHIBIT 2
PROCEEDS FROM SALE & RETURNS
BEFORE TAX
TOTAL COSTS FOR ALL CONDOS
TOTAL COSTS PER CONDO
TOTAL CONDO SALES REVENUE
TOTAL REVENUE PER CONDO
TOTAL COSTS FOR SLIPS
TOTAL COST PER CONDO
TOTAL SLIP REVENUE
TOTAL REVENUE PER CONDO
TOTAL PROFITS
TOTAL PROFIT PER CONDO
$794,466
$2,780,631
$3,575,097
$100,000
$100,000
$1,000,000
$6,000,000
$7,200,000
$1,615,949
$1,589
$5,561
$7,150
$200
$200
$2,000
$12,000
$14,400
$3,232
$52,082,083 $104,164
$46,082,083
$75,000,000
$6,000,000
$9,000,000
$31,917,917
$92,164
$150,000
$12,000
$18,000
$63,836
RETURN ON INVESTMENT (ROI) 61.28%
EXHIBIT 3
RETURN AFTER TAX
Total Profit $31,917,917
Tax Liability (@50%) (TL) $15,958,959
INCOME AFTER TAX $15,958,959
RETURN ON INVESTMENT (ATR) 30.64%
I-,
C,
